DHS, 2022년 공적부담 입국불허 규정 폐지하는 최종규칙 발표

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

Final rule.

DHS is rescinding the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations (“2022 Final Rule”). The 2022 Final Rule was not the best implementation of the statute. It was inconsistent with congressional intent, unduly restrictive, and hampered DHS's ability to make accurate, precise, and reliable determinations of whether certain aliens are likely at any time to become a public charge. Rescission restores broader discretion for DHS officers to evaluate all pertinent facts and aligns with long-standing policy that aliens in the United States should be self-reliant and government benefits should not incentivize immigration. This rule also revises the breach and cancellation of public charge bonds regulations.

The final rule is effective on September 18, 2026. This rule applies to applications for admission made on or after September 18, 2026 or applications for adjustment of status postmarked or electronically submitted on or after September 18, 2026. Receipt of means-tested public benefits before September 18, 2026 will be considered consistently with the 2022 Final Rule.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), DHS, 5900 Capital Gateway Drive, Camp Springs, MD 20746; telephone (240) 721-3000 (not a toll-free call).

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

B. Legal Authority

C. Summary of the Proposed Rule

D. Implementation

E. Costs and Benefits

II. Background

A. Legal Authority

B. Grounds of Inadmissibility Generally

C. Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility

III. Response to Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

A. Summary of Public Comments

B. Comments Expressing General Support for the Proposed Rule

C. Comments Expressing General Opposition to the Proposed Rule

D. Comments Regarding Legal Authority and Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority

2. Congressional Intent and Historical Application

3. Administrative Law Concerns

4. Constitutional Concerns

5. Prospective Application of the Final Rule and Retroactivity Concerns

E. Negative Impacts on DHS and Immigration Policy Objectives

1. Concerns About Immigration Officer Discretion

2. Lack of Replacement Language or Framework

3. Immigration System Impacts, Operational Burdens, and Processing Delays

4. Misalignment With Longstanding Immigration Policies or U.S. Values

F. Negative Impacts on Applicants, Petitioners, Beneficiaries, and Support Systems

1. Chilling Effects on Benefit Usage

2. Concerns About Clarity and Discrimination

G. Negative Impacts on U.S. Economy, Businesses, and Communities

1. Workforce Impacts

2. Impacts of Reduced Consumer Spending

3. Concerns About U.S. Demographics

4. Impacts on Housing

5. Impacts to Innovation

6. Other Economic Effects

7. Impacts on the Military and Veterans

H. DHS's Rationale and Justification for the Rule

1. Insufficient Evidence or Reasoned Justification To Change Policy

2. Insufficient Connection Between Receipt and Dependency on the Government

3. Would Not Accomplish Stated Goal To Reduce Public Expenditures

4. Agreement With Stated Need for Proposed Rule

I. Amendments to Cancellation and Breach of Public Charge Bond Provisions

J. Removal of 8 CFR 212.20, “Applicability of Public Charge Inadmissibility”

K. Removal of the Public Charge Regulatory Definitions

1. General Comments

2. Definition of “Likely at Any Time To Become a Public Charge”

3. Definition of “Public Benefits”

4. Definition of “Receipt (of Public Benefits)”

5. Definitions of “Government” and “Household”

L. Removal of the Public Charge Inadmissibility Determination Framework

1. Minimum Factors

2. Consideration of the Affidavit of Support

3. Consideration of Current and/or Past Receipt of Public Benefits

4. Disability Alone Is Not Sufficient

5. Totality of the Circumstances

6. Written Denial Requirement

7. Receipt of Public Benefits While an Alien Is in an Immigration Category Exempt From the Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, or of Benefits Available to Refugees

M. Elimination of List of Exemptions and Waivers (8 CFR 212.23)

1. General Opposition to Removal

2. General Support for Removal

3. Certain Cubans and Haitians

4. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

N. Comments Unrelated to Specific Regulatory Sections

1. General Comments

2. Comments on the Development of Future Public Charge Inadmissibility Policy Interpretive Tool

3. Privacy and Personal Data Concerns

4. Recommendations for Public Charge Inadmissibility Regulations or Subregulatory Guidance

5. Recommendations for Implementation

6. Severability

7. Other Comments

O. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

1. Costs, Benefits, and Transfer Payments

2. Regulatory Flexibility Act

3. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

4. Other Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

P. Out-of-Scope

1. Support for Immigration and Opposition to Restrictive Immigration Policies

2. Opposition to Immigration Generally

3. Miscellaneous

IV. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and Executive Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation)

1. Summary of Changes From the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to the Final Rule

2. Summary of the Regulatory Changes

3. Background and Purpose

4. Population

5. Cost-Benefit Analysis

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

D. Small Business Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Congressional Review Act)

E. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

F. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

G. Family Assessment

H. Executive Order 13175 (Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments)

I. National Environmental Policy Act

J. Paperwork Reduction Act

APA—Administrative Procedure Act

ASC—Application Support Center

BIA—Board of Immigration Appeals

CCBG—Child Care and Development Block Grant

CBO—Congressional Budget Office

CBP—U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations

CHIP—Children's Health Insurance Program

CMS—Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

CNMI—Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

COVID-19—Coronavirus Disease 2019

CPI-U—Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers ( printed page 45325)

CPS—Current Population Survey

CTC—Child Tax Credit

DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOJ—Department of Justice

DOS—U.S. Department of State

EAD—Employment Authorization Document

eFMAP—Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage

EITC—Earned Income Tax Credit

E.O.—Executive Order

FAM—Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual

FAS—Freely Associated States

FFP—Federal Financial Participation

FMAP—Federal Medical Assistance Percentage

FOIA—Freedom of Information Act

FR—Federal Register

FY—Fiscal Year

GW—George Washington University

HCV—Housing Choice Voucher

HHS—U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HSA—Homeland Security Act

HUD—U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

ICE—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICR—Information Collection Request

IIRIRA—Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

IMF—International Monetary Fund

INA—Immigration and Nationality Act

INS—Immigration and Naturalization Service

IRCA—Immigration Reform and Control Act

KFF—Kaiser Family Foundation

LPR—Lawful Permanent Resident

NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act

NEPA—National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA—U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NOID—Notice of Intent to Deny

NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTA—Notice to Appear

NTMVS Act—National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966

OBBBA—One Big Beautiful Bill Act

OHP—Oregon Health Plan

OMB—Office of Management and Budget

PII—Personally Identifiable Information

PRA—Paperwork Reduction Act

PRWORA—Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

RFE—Request for Evidence

RIA—Regulatory Impact Analysis

SNAP—Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

SSA—Social Security Administration

SSI—Supplemental Security Income

TANF—Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

TPS—Temporary Protected Status

UBI—Universal Basic Income

UMRA—Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

U.S.C.—United States Code

USCIS—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

USDA—U.S. Department of Agriculture

VAWA—Violence Against Women Act

WIC—Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children

The purpose of this rule is to remove from the Code of Federal Regulations the public charge inadmissibility provisions promulgated by the Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility final rule (2022 Final Rule),[1] as these provisions straitjacket DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). SeePublic Law 104-193, section 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601). The 2022 Final Rule imposed narrow definitions of statutory terms and minimum factors as well as limited the public benefits that DHS could consider in a public charge inadmissibility determination. Indeed, the 2022 Final Rule created a framework under which officers were directed to consider seven factors (five of those required by statute) rather than being explicitly empowered to consider any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances.[2]

DHS is moving away from a bright line primary dependence standard. By removing most [3] of the regulatory provisions in the 2022 Final Rule, DHS can implement policy and interpretive tools guiding officers in making individualized, fact-specific public charge inadmissibility determinations, based on a totality of the alien's circumstances, consistent with the statute, congressional intent, and precedent.[4] These tools will guide public charge inadmissibility determinations while empowering officers to consider: (1) the mandatory statutory factors in section 212(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B); (2) the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits; (3) any other individualized case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to an alien's case; and (4) any empirical data relevant to an alien's self-sufficiency. Using good judgment and discretion, officers will more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, in the totality of the circumstances, as Congress intended.

DHS reviewed and considered the feedback and recommendations submitted in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

The authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) for the rescissions and regulatory amendments is found in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), (public charge inadmissibility determinations); section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, (applicants for admission); and section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255, (eligibility criteria for applications for adjustment of status). In addition, section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), authorizes the Secretary to establish such regulations as deemed necessary for carrying out the Secretary's authority under the INA.

On November 19, 2025, DHS published an NPRM titled Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). In the NPRM, DHS proposed the following changes:

DHS received 8,846 [5] comments on the proposed rule, the majority of which opposed the rule. Following careful consideration of public comments received, DHS is issuing this final rule as proposed. The preamble to this final rule includes summaries of significant issues raised by the comments and includes responsive explanations for policy changes.

DHS will begin implementing this final rule on its effective date. This final rule will apply to applications for adjustment of status that are postmarked or electronically submitted on or after the effective date and applications for admission made on or after the effective date. On or before the effective date, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance to inform, but not prescribe, the outcome of USCIS officers' public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule in the totality of the circumstances. In addition, DHS will only consider the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance and long-term institutionalization at government expense before the effective date of this final rule and will consider the receipt of any means tested public benefits on or after that date.

DHS is removing most of the 2022 Final Rule provisions to allow DHS to better implement the public charge ground of inadmissibility. The final rule is expected to impose new benefits and transfers. To assess the impacts of the rule, DHS considers the potential impacts of the rule relative to a no-action baseline, which reflects the current state of the world absent this regulatory action.

The primary source of unquantified benefits of this rule is the removal of overly restrictive provisions promulgated in the 2022 Final Rule that hinder officers in making public charge inadmissibility determinations. By removing rigid regulatory definitions and standards, this rule ensures that officers can make highly individualized, fact-specific, case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions based on the totality of each alien's individual circumstances. This approach will prevent the application of overly restrictive criteria that straitjackets DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations.

The rule will also result in a reduction in transfer payments from Federal and State governments to individuals who may choose to disenroll from or forgo enrollment in a public benefits program. Individuals who might choose to disenroll from or forgo future enrollment in a public benefits program include aliens as well as U.S. citizens who are members of mixed-status households. DHS estimates that the total reduction in transfer payments from the Federal and State governments could be approximately $13.05 billion annually due to disenrollment or forgone enrollment in public benefits programs by members of households that include aliens who may be receiving public benefits. DHS estimates that the 10-year discounted Federal and State transfer payments reduction of this rule could be approximately $111.28 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and about $91.62 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. This total includes DHS's estimate that Federal transfer payments could decrease by approximately $65.76 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and about $54.14 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. Using the average Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), DHS further estimates that State transfer payments could decrease by approximately $45.52 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and approximately $37.48 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. DHS notes there may be additional reductions in transfer payments that we are unable to quantify. DHS also recognizes that the estimated reductions in transfer payments are approximations and could be influenced by external factors unrelated to this rule. For example, the recent changes to Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) included in H.R. 1 are expected to impact enrollment rates, adding complexity to quantification efforts.[6] DHS anticipates that disenrollment or forgone enrollment rates may fluctuate independently of this rule, potentially affecting the transfer payment estimates presented. However, those external factors are separate and independent of this rule.

Finally, DHS recognizes that reductions in Federal and State transfers under Federal benefits programs may have downstream and upstream impacts on State and local economies, large and small businesses, and individuals. For example, the rule might result in reduced revenues for healthcare providers, such as hospitals and nonprofits, participating in Medicaid, companies that manufacture medical supplies or pharmaceuticals, grocery retailers participating in SNAP, agricultural producers who grow foods that are eligible for purchase using SNAP benefits. Landlords participating in federally funded housing programs may also experience financial strain, such as increased tenant turnover and higher administrative costs.

Table I.1 provides a detailed summary of the regulatory changes and the estimated costs, benefits, and transfers associated with the expected impacts.7

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The Secretary's authority for issuing this rule is found in various sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA).[8] Section 102 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, charge the Secretary with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Section 101 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 111, establishes that part of DHS's primary mission is to ensure that efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland do not diminish either the overall economic security of the United States or the civil rights and civil liberties of persons.

In addition to establishing the Secretary's general authority for the administration and enforcement of immigration laws, section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, enumerates various related authorities, including the Secretary's authority to establish such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, issue such instructions, and perform such other acts as the Secretary deems necessary for carrying out such authority.

Section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), provides that any alien who applies for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status is inadmissible if he or she is likely at any time to become a public charge. In general, under section 213 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183, the Secretary has the discretion to admit into the United States an alien who is determined to be inadmissible based only on the public charge ground upon the giving of a suitable and proper bond or undertaking approved by the Secretary.

Under section 213A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, certain aliens are required to submit a sufficient Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the INA (Form I-864) executed by a sponsor who agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line [9] during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable. The Form I-864 is intended to ensure that an intending immigrant has adequate means of financial support and is not likely to rely on the U.S. Government for financial support.

Section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, addresses the inspection of applicants for admission, including inadmissibility determinations of such aliens.

Section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255, generally establishes eligibility criteria for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident (LPR).

The United States has a long history of permitting aliens to enter the United States, whether permanently or on a temporary basis. At the same time, Congress has excluded aliens who pose a threat to the safety or general welfare of the country or who seek to violate immigration laws.[10]

Congress has exercised this authority in part by establishing the concepts of admission [11] and inadmissibility in the INA.[12] Aliens are inadmissible due to a range of acts, conditions, and conduct.[13] If an alien is inadmissible that alien is ineligible to be admitted to the United States and ineligible to receive a visa, unless he or she applies for and receives a waiver of inadmissibility or other form of relief. Congress extended the applicability of the inadmissibility grounds beyond the context of applications for admission and visas by making admissibility an eligibility requirement for certain immigration benefits, including adjustment of status to that of an LPR.[14] If an alien is inadmissible, that alien is also ineligible for those benefits unless the alien is eligible to apply for and received waiver of inadmissibility or other form of relief, where available and appropriate.[15]

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Section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), states any alien who applies for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status is inadmissible if in the opinion of the consular officer or immigration officer, as applicable, the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. The public charge ground of inadmissibility, therefore, applies to aliens applying for a visa to come to the United States temporarily or permanently, for admission at or between ports of entry,[16] and for adjustment of status to that of an LPR.[17] Under the statute, some categories of aliens are exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility, while others, if found inadmissible under the public charge ground, may apply for a waiver of the public charge ground of inadmissibility or may be invited to submit a public charge bond.[18]

The INA does not define the terms “public charge” or “likely at any time to become a public charge.” However, it does specify that when determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge, consular officers and immigration officers must, at a minimum, consider the alien's age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Section 212(a)(4)(B)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(ii), permits consular officers or immigration officers to consider any Form I-864 submitted on the alien's behalf, when determining whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge.[19] In fact, with very limited exceptions, most aliens seeking family-based immigrant visas and adjustment of status, and certain aliens seeking employment-based immigrant visas or adjustment of status, must submit a sufficient Form I-864 in order to avoid being found inadmissible as likely at any time to become a public charge. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(C) and (D), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C) and (D).

In general, under section 213 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183, the Secretary has the discretion to admit into the United States an alien who is determined to be inadmissible only on the public charge ground upon the giving of a suitable and proper bond or undertaking approved by the Secretary. See INA sec. 213, 8 U.S.C. 1183.

On November 19, 2025, DHS published the NPRM, Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). The public comment period on the NPRM closed on December 19, 2025, and the public comment period on the associated information collection closed on January 20, 2026.[20] Following careful consideration of public comments received, DHS is issuing this final rule as proposed. The following section of the preamble includes a detailed summary and analysis of public comments received. Comments received may be reviewed at the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) at https://www.regulations.gov, docket number USCIS-2025-0304.

For a detailed description of the history of the public charge ground of inadmissibility, public benefits under PRWORA, and prior public charge rulemakings, please refer to the NPRM.

DHS intends the changes to 8 CFR 103.6(c) to be severable from the full rescission of regulatory provisions in 8 CFR part 212. To the extent a court finds this final rule rescinding the public charge inadmissibility regulations in 8 CFR 212.20 through 212.23 is invalid or unenforceable, DHS intends that certain changes to 8 CFR 103.6(c) nevertheless be construed so as to continue to give the maximum effect to those provision(s) permitted by law, unless they are also held to be wholly invalid and unenforceable. Specifically, DHS intends to continue to give effect to the removal of the ground for cancellation 8 CFR 103.6(c)(1) stating that DHS can cancel a public charge bond at any time if it determines “that the alien is not likely at any time to become a public charge” because, as discussed in the NPRM, the rationale for the proposed removal of that ground of cancellation is based on the practical infeasibility of applying it rather than the broader justification for rescinding 8 CFR 212.20 through 212.23. 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). Similarly, if not separately invalidated or deemed unenforceable, DHS intends to keep the revised restructuring of 8 CFR 103.6(c)(1), separating the cancelation and breach provisions into paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) for clarity.

On November 19, 2025, DHS published an NPRM titled Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS received 8,846 comments on the proposed rule, the majority of which opposed the rule. Most of the comment submissions were from individual or anonymous commenters, including attorneys and academic researchers. Other commenters included healthcare providers, legal service providers, research and religious organizations, advocacy groups, social and community organizations, professional associations, State and local government agencies and elected officials, trade and business organizations, unions, schools and universities, and a foreign government entity.

Comment: Several commenters were generally in favor of the proposed rule. Some of the commenters who supported the proposal stated that public benefit programs are intended for Americans and that the government should put America first.

Many commenters who supported the rule expressed concern about the burden of benefit use by immigrants on available resources, stating the government should not allow immigrants to burden the benefit systems for Americans. Several commenters stated that the United ( printed page 45331) States should eliminate the potential for aliens to be incentivized to immigrate for public benefits, with some commenters referencing aliens' fraud and abuse of public benefit programs, taking advantage of the United States, draining resources, or disproportionately benefiting from assistance at taxpayer expense. One commenter stated that resources for new immigrants should be limited, with another stating that when conditions for U.S. citizens in America improve immigrants can be helped. One commenter expressed their belief that supplemental programs are meant to be a temporary aid but that there are insufficient regulations to prevent such aid from becoming a lifestyle. Other commenters expressed support for the rule, remarking that immigrants should demonstrate advanced education, personal savings, and value provided to the United States upon admission.

Response: DHS agrees that aliens applying for admission and adjustment of status who are subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility should be self-sufficient and should not depend on the government to meet their needs. DHS also agrees that the availability of public benefits should not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States, as Congress indicated in PRWORA.[21] This rulemaking seeks to align public charge inadmissibility determinations with those concepts. DHS firmly believes that this was Congress's intent in enacting section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).

This rulemaking will empower officers to consider not only the mandatory statutory factors and an alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, but also all relevant evidence and information in the record specific to the alien as the officers determine whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. This will restore a public charge inadmissibility determination that relies on DHS officers' good judgment and sound discretion as envisioned by Congress.

DHS emphasizes neither the public charge ground of inadmissibility nor this final rule govern eligibility for means-tested public benefits; rather they govern which aliens are inadmissible and, therefore, ineligible for admission and adjustment of status. This final rule does not address the government's responsibility to care for aliens or which aliens are, or should be, eligible to receive means-tested public benefits.

Comment: Many commenters expressed general opposition to the rule. Some stated that the rule is unfair, cruel and inhumane or barbaric, that previous poverty is not a reason to penalize a person today, and that every human deserves to be cared for and treated respectfully. Some disagreed with the basis of the rule, commenting that the rule is not right for the country. One commenter called the rule pointless, with another stating the rule is unnecessary and would negatively impact children.

Response: DHS strongly disagrees that the rule is pointless, unnecessary, or unfair. The purpose of this rule is to remove the public charge inadmissibility provisions promulgated by the 2022 Final Rule, 87 FR 55472 (Sept. 9, 2022), as these provisions straitjacketed DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the PRWORA.[22] The 2022 Final Rule imposed narrow definitions of statutory terms and minimum factors as well as limited the public benefits that DHS could consider in a public charge inadmissibility determination, preventing officers from considering all factors and information relevant to an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, as Congress intended. See 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). Rescission of the 2022 Final Rule allows officers to more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge using good judgment and discretion, consider the mandatory statutory factors in section 212(a)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B), the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, all individualized case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to an alien's case, and any empirical data relevant to an alien's self-sufficiency.

Comment: A commenter wrote that the proposed rule is not practical and instead driven by a desire to resurrect a punitive approach that was widely rejected by public health experts, State and local governments, and advocates.

Response: DHS rejects the suggestion that it is resurrecting the public charge ground of inadmissibility approach found in the 2019 Final Rule, 84 FR 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019). As it made clear in the NPRM, previous regulations relating to the public charge ground of inadmissibility were overly restrictive.[23] By removing (not replacing or amending) the rigid definitions and factors, this final rule will allow officers to consider all case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to the public charge inadmissibility determination, in the totality of the circumstances. This in turn enables officers to more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. DHS is not implementing the provisions of the 2019 Final Rule in this final rule.

Comment: One commenter stated that this rule is intended to reduce immigration to the United States, which only Congress can do via statute.

Response: While it is possible this rule may decrease the number of aliens who will be admitted into or granted adjustment of status in the United States, as explained elsewhere in this final rule, DHS is unable to quantify those impacts due to the nature of the individualized case-by-case determination required by statute. DHS strongly disagrees that it is aiming to reduce immigration in excess of its statutory authority. While Congress established annual numerical limitations for certain immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications, Congress has not mandated, nor would it be practical to mandate, that these limits be fully utilized given specific eligibility criteria and other congressionally imposed restrictions, such as specific grounds of inadmissibility. See e.g., INA secs. 202, 203, 212 and 214; 8 U.S.C. 1152, 1153, 1182, and 1184. In fact, Congress provided for the rollover or reallocation of immigrant visas in certain circumstances. See e.g., INA sec. 201, 203, and 206, 8 U.S.C. 1151, 1153, and 1156.

The very purpose of the public charge ground of inadmissibility is to prevent the admission and adjustment of status of aliens who are determined by an officer to be likely at any time to become a public charge. Indeed, since 1882, Congress has clearly decided to limit the admission of such aliens.[24] To the extent the commenter does not like that this ground of inadmissibility prevents the admission and adjustment of status of certain aliens, the complaint is for Congress, not DHS. More than 70 years ago Congress recognized that setting the parameters for determining whether an ( printed page 45332) alien is likely at any time to become a public charge is best left to the judgment and interpretation of the executive branch and the courts because the elements constituting public charge are so varied.[25] If Congress wanted to conclusively define what it means to be “likely at any time to become a public charge” it would have done so when enacting immigration statutes in 1882,[26] 1891,[27] 1903,[28] 1907,[29] 1917,[30] 1952,[31] 1990,[32] or 1996.[33] However, Congress, at no point during the history of the public charge inadmissibility ground, limited the manner in which the executive branch made public charge inadmissibility determinations save providing a non-exhaustive list of factors that must be considered, in 1996.

As referenced in the NPRM and this final rule, with the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule DHS is eliminating a rigid regulatory framework and restoring broader officer discretion, which ensures that aliens whom DHS has determined are likely at any time to become a public charge are not admitted or granted adjustment of status, as Congress intended.

Comment: Several commenters said this rulemaking overreached the powers granted in the statute by Congress. Another said removal of the 2022 Final Rule is unlawful.

Response: DHS strongly disagrees that the removal of the 2022 Final Rule is unlawful or goes beyond the powers granted to DHS by Congress. The Secretary's authority for issuing this rule is found in various sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and the HSA. Section 102 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, charge the Secretary with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Indeed, this rulemaking is within DHS's express authority to enforce and administer the immigration laws of the United States, section 103(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), including the public charge ground of inadmissibility, section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). For these reasons as well as those discussed previously, the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule does not exceed the Secretary's authority.

The removal of the 2022 Final Rule in favor of a broader exercise of discretion on a case-by-case basis is a permissible implementation of the public charge inadmissibility statute enacted by Congress. See INA sec. 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). DHS believes that the express language of sections 212(a)(4)(A) and (B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A) and (B), the longstanding national policy on immigration and welfare, and the precedent decisions that have guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guidance for DHS officers to make public charge inadmissibility determinations.

Comment: Some commenters stated that section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), does not authorize DHS to consider the past or present receipt of non-cash public benefits, and added that such consideration would constitute an impermissible expansion of the statutory criteria and undermine the intent of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Another commenter similarly stated that the expansion of the public charge definition to include non-cash benefits lacks a clear basis in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), or precedent decisions.

Response: DHS is neither promulgating definitions for the terms “public charge” or “public benefits” through this rulemaking. As proposed in the NPRM, DHS believes that retaining regulations that disregard receipt of certain means-tested public benefits, when such receipt is relevant to assessing an alien's likelihood of becoming a public charge, is not the best reading of the statute. DHS is therefore removing the rigid provisions in the 2022 Final Rule, including limitations on what public benefits may be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination, which prevented officers from making public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with the clear self-sufficiency goals articulated by Congress in PRWORA. Consideration of non-cash public benefits in a public charge inadmissibility determination is neither precluded by section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), nor inconsistent with precedent decisions.[34]

In fact, when passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress added a list of minimum, but not exclusive, factors to consider in public charge inadmissibility determinations but did not preclude consideration of any other factors including the alien's receipt of non-cash public benefits. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). Moreover, DHS disagrees that Congress intended to exclude consideration of non-cash benefits when it enacted section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Congress does not mention public benefits at all in section 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), leaving it to the agencies administering the public charge ground of inadmissibility [35] to specify how public benefits should be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination. However, Congress did prohibit consideration of any public benefits under 8 U.S.C. 1641(c) for certain battered aliens, without reference to cash versus non-cash benefits, which strongly suggests Congress understood and accepted DHS's consideration of past receipt of any public benefits—cash and non-cash alike—in all other circumstances. INA sec. 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(s). DHS further disagrees that precedent decisions preclude consideration of non-cash benefits. On the contrary, as concluded in past precedent decisions that have informed public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades, receipt of public support of any kind is an appropriate consideration in a public charge inadmissibility determination.[36]

Comment: A commenter stated removal of 2022 Final Rule contradicts DHS's statutory obligation to administer immigration laws fairly, equitably, and without discrimination.

Response: DHS disagrees. As noted above, DHS has the authority to enforce ( printed page 45333) and administer the immigration laws of the United States, including the public charge ground of inadmissibility and to prescribe regulations necessary to carry out that authority. INA sec. 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), INA sec. 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3). By removing regulations that the Secretary determined are rigid, overly-restrictive, and not the best implementation of the statute, DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to a broader exercise of discretion on a case-by-case basis, consistent with Congress's express national policy on immigration and welfare and in line with the spirit of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). With this rulemaking, DHS returns to a standard which permits DHS officers to consider any and all factors, in the totality of the circumstances, relevant to each individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge.[37] As discussed in other comment responses, DHS disagrees any changes in this final rule risk inviting discriminatory decision-making.

Comment: One commenter, citing Loper Bright v. Raimondo ,[38] stated that “legal interpretation” of statutes—even statutes Congress expressly authorized agencies to implement, like section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)—is a judicial function driven by “traditional tools of statutory interpretation,” not the “policy preferences” of the Executive, adding the statute has a fixed, single best meaning which courts (and not the Supreme Court alone) must interpret and agencies must implement. The commenter said DHS mistakenly treats statutory meaning merely as a regulatory choice and mischaracterizes “primary dependence on the government for subsistence” as a “bright-line . . . standard” rather than acknowledging it is the statute's single best meaning. Another commenter indicated the rule suffers from the same defects which led courts to enjoin the 2019 Final Rule under the more deferential Chevron [39] framework, adding that Loper Bright requires agencies to adopt a statute's best reading and asserted the existing regulatory framework reflects a better, if not the best reading. Another cited to Loper Bright, stating the Administration is not entitled to any deference when interpreting a statute in a way that is contrary to its plain meaning, history, and tradition. Another commenter said DHS does not have unchecked power, authority, or flexibility in defining the term public charge contrary to congressional intent.

Response: The Supreme Court in Loper Bright held that courts are no longer required to defer to an agency's “reasonable” interpretations of ambiguous statutes. DHS strongly disagrees with the commenters' suggestion that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is simply a policy decision. On the contrary, it is a direct result of the Secretary's determination that the 2022 Final Rule is not the best reading of the statute, as well as congressional intent on immigration and welfare. As noted in the NPRM, DHS is removing the 2022 Final Rule to restore the longstanding case-by-case and inherently discretionary nature of public charge inadmissibility determinations expressly intended by Congress when mandating officers make these determinations in their opinion considering certain enumerated non-exhaustive factors at a minimum. 90 FR 52168, 52189 (Nov. 19, 2025). INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). The Secretary determined rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is appropriate to ensure officers are making public charge inadmissibility determinations in line with the statute and relevant precedent. 90 FR 52168, 52186-87 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS believes relevant precedent decisions that guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades and, where applicable, recent circuit case law will provide officers with sufficient guidance to conduct individualized determinations based on the specific facts and circumstances of each alien's case. DHS believes this approach falls within the explicit discretionary authority Congress delegated to the Secretary.[40] Therefore, DHS's rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, and subsequent administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility consistent with the statute and applicable precedent, is well within the Secretary's authority. It is also consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in PRWORA. See8 U.S.C. 1601. Therefore, this final rule does not reflect an exercise of unchecked power or unauthorized flexibility contrary to congressional intent.

Finally, DHS disagrees that it is interpreting the term “public charge” in this final rule, or that any such interpretation is contrary to its plain meaning, history, or tradition. As proposed and discussed previously, this final rule is putting forth no definition of the term “public charge.” As discussed in the NPRM, there is no single settled meaning of the term and courts have differed in their positions regarding what the term encompasses, as well as what DHS can consider when making public charge inadmissibility determinations.[41] DHS does not dispute that the Supreme Court has tasked courts with ascertaining the best meaning of ambiguous statutes or that a number of federal courts found different meanings for the term. DHS, in operating the national immigration system, is not precluded from eliminating regulatory definitions and rigid frameworks that have not been definitively or uniformly endorsed as reflecting the best meaning of statutory terms, particularly where Congress delegated broad discretion to DHS over immigration and the public charge ( printed page 45334) ground of inadmissibility. DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to decades of agency practice, consistent with statute and binding precedent.

Comment: A commenter stated that the “extraordinary breadth” of authority DHS exerts with the proposed rule, coupled with the economic significance of the action, also opens the proposed rule to major questions doctrine concerns under West Virginia v. EPA.[42] The commenter warned that courts would be skeptical to conclude Congress meant to confer this level of political and economic authority to DHS, writing that “reliance on Executive Orders to enact policy unmoored from statutory text and agency discretion has given rise to claims during this Administration that agency action is preordained.”

Response: DHS disagrees that this final rule implicates the major questions doctrine as articulated in West Virgina v. EPA. The major questions doctrine is triggered when the agency claims regulatory authority of vast economic and political significance, and the asserted authority lacks clear congressional authorization.[43]

First, DHS has clear congressional authorization for this final rule. As discussed throughout this preamble, the INA provides that an alien is inadmissible if, “in the opinion of the consular officer or the Attorney General” (now the Secretary of Homeland Security), the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A). The statutory text does not define public charge or likely at any time to become a public charge and only requires officers to consider a non-exhaustive list of specified minimum factors. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the political branches possess plenary authority over admission of aliens.[44] And the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) repeatedly recognized the inherently discretionary nature of the public charge inadmissibility determinations.[45] This statutory structure reflects an express delegation from Congress to the Secretary, explicit discretionary language (“in the opinion of”), and mandatory but non-exhaustive factors. Unlike the statutes at issue in West Virgina v. EPA, or Biden v. Nebraska ,[46] Congress did not assign a narrow, technical function that DHS has transformed into sweeping economic regulation. Congress instead gave DHS broad discretion in an immigration inadmissibility context. Unlike cases where agencies argued for an expansion of authority or claimed transformative new regulatory powers, in this final rule DHS is doing the opposite: it is rescinding rigid regulatory definitions adopted in 2022; restoring individualized, discretionary adjudications that track the plain language of the statute; and returning to long-standing totality of the circumstances analysis. This administrative calibration is within the precise domain Congress delegated: immigration admissibility.

Furthermore, the economic impact of this final rule does not alone trigger the major questions doctrine. The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) estimates potential transfer effects related to public benefits disenrollment, which is an indirect impact of the final rule. But the Supreme Court has made clear economic impact alone does not trigger the doctrine. In West Virginia v. EPA, the Court emphasized the doctrine applies when agencies claim the power to make decisions of “vast economic and political significance” in a manner inconsistent with their statutory design.[47] Admissibility determinations, which could impact aliens' decisions to disenroll from public benefits programs, are squarely within DHS's statutory domain. Importantly, this final rule does not purport to regulate public benefit eligibility; rather, public benefits eligibility remains governed by PRWORA and other statutes. Any economic effects are incidental to admissibility determinations Congress explicitly authorized DHS to make. Finally, immigration is an area of heightened executive authority given that the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the political branches' broad authority over admission and exclusion.[48] This final rule pertains to admission eligibility and adjustment of status, but it does not more broadly regulate aliens' or citizens' conduct or restructure domestic industries.

Finally, this final rule does not reflect a transformative expansion of agency power, it simply implicates existing delegated authority that DHS is tailoring to more closely reflect the plain language of the statute, national policy on self-sufficiency of aliens, and longstanding agency practice.

Comment: Citing section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), a commenter remarked DHS's choice to rescind the public charge regulations without promulgating a replacement regulation is inconsistent with the INA, which explicitly provides that the Secretary “shall establish such regulations . . . as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.”

Response: DHS disagrees that it is required to promulgate a regulation to replace the rescinded 2022 Final Rule and notes this rulemaking is a permissible change in the manner in which DHS makes public charge inadmissibility determinations given prior interpretations of the statute were not the best interpretation. 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). On the contrary, while the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) mandates the process agencies must follow when issuing, amending, and rescinding regulations, it does not require agencies to replace a rescinded regulation. 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Indeed, an agency may change or rescind regulations as long as it provides a reasoned justification,[49] but it is not required to replace a rescinded regulation unless required by law. There is nothing in the express language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), requiring DHS to replace the rescinded 2022 Final Rule with a new rule. Further, DHS notes there were no regulations governing public charge inadmissibility determinations from 1882 until the 2019 Final Rule.

Although this is a change from the frameworks established since 1999, DHS emphasizes that it provided a reasoned justification for the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule in the NPRM and throughout this final rule, as well as an explanation as to why prior frameworks were lacking.[50] This position aligns with the plain language of section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), which the commenter cites—which by incorporating the phrase “as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority” grants the Secretary both authority and discretion over issuing regulations. In this case, the Secretary has determined that issuing replacement regulations is not necessary for carrying out his authority. Therefore, DHS will not issue a replacement rule.

Comment: Some commenters said DHS's emphasis on the subjective nature of the public charge inadmissibility determination contradicts the INA, which vests ( printed page 45335) discretionary authority with the Attorney General, not DHS. Specifically, the commenter suggests that it is only the opinion of the Attorney General, not the opinion of an individual DHS officer, that is relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations.

Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' interpretations of DHS' statutory authority. On March 1, 2003, functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were transferred from the Department of Justice (DOJ) to DHS.[51] Although several provisions of the INA discussed in this final rule refer exclusively to the “Attorney General,” such provisions are now read as referring to the Secretary by operation of the HSA.[52] DHS rejects the suggestion that only the Attorney General's (now, the Secretary's) opinion is relevant in the context of a public charge inadmissibility determination when an alien applies for admission or adjustment of status. Congress understood that the Attorney General and Secretary delegate authorities throughout the INA to officials serving under them.[53] DHS notes that no ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), contains language referencing DHS or DOJ officers; throughout the section, Congress referred to consular officers, the Attorney General, or the Secretary. DHS also notes that section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), states that the status of an alien “may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion” to that of an LPR. Congress knew that the Attorney General would not personally make millions of admissibility, adjustment of status, admission, and deportation decisions annually.

Comment: One commenter suggested that the rule is unjustified because DHS does not identify relevant post-1999 or post-2022 laws, data, or experience not already considered by INS, USCIS, or any other component or predecessor of DHS that would justify this change. The commenter requested that DHS identify and describe the legal authorities and other information, apart from those that predated the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and the 2022 Final Rule, that DHS relied on in developing a new framework.

Response: DHS's rescission of the 2022 Final Rule and return to a broader exercise of case-by-case discretion is based on the same statutes, authorities, and other resources that served as the basis and justification for the 2022 Final Rule. DHS rejects this commenter's suggestion that DHS cannot rely on previously considered authorities.

On the contrary, DHS may rely on the same authorities underlying the now rescinded 2022 Final Rule so long as DHS provides a reasoned explanation for coming to a different conclusion, which it has, and as long as the new approach is consistent with the plain language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).[54] DHS explained the change and why DHS believes it to be a better reading of the statute. As explained in other comment responses, DHS has the express authority to enforce and administer the immigration laws of the United States, including the public charge ground of inadmissibility, and finds support for this rule in the express language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), the national statements of immigration policy and welfare in PRWORA, and the sources listed in the NPRM. See 90 FR 52168, 52181-82 (Nov. 19, 2025).

Comment: Commenters stated that DHS's reliance on section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), to support its argument that Congress intended consideration of past benefit receipt in all contexts outside of certain battered aliens is flawed. One commenter said the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provisions speak broadly about benefits but do not support DHS's contention that Congress intended DHS to consider receipt of benefits beyond those considered in the 1999 Interim Field Guidance. Another commenter said the language in section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), is not an express command to consider all means-tested public benefits, calling the proposal “particularly dubious” because Congress repeatedly expanded public benefit programs for certain aliens.

Response: DHS disagrees that section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), does not support considering the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefit in public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule. Section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s),[55] prohibits considering the receipt of benefits by certain victims of violence and trafficking in applications for immigrant visas and adjustment of status and was codified to ensure they could access the full range of support services necessary for recovery and cooperation with law enforcement, including healthcare, housing, food assistance, and other non-cash benefits.[56] The fact that Congress expressly precluded the consideration of receipt of benefits by this population strongly suggests that, absent such an exception, Congress intended DHS to consider the receipt of benefits when other aliens applied for immigrant visas and adjustment of status. “`Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ” [57] Similarly, when Congress creates a specific exception to a general rule, it is presumed that Congress intended the general rule to apply in all other circumstances.[58] Accordingly, section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), reflects that Congress understood that unless expressly exempted, an alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits would be considered in all other applications for immigrant visas and adjustment of status.

As noted in the NPRM, the term benefits in section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), is properly interpreted as ( printed page 45336) including both cash means-tested public benefits and non-cash means-tested public benefits since Congress did not limit benefits to cash assistance for income maintenance as the commenters suggest; it used the broad term “benefits.” 90 FR 52168, 52187 (Nov. 19, 2025). Additionally, Congress cross-referenced 8 U.S.C. 1641(c), which defines Federal public benefits as “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States; and . . . any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States,” clearly including both cash and non-cash benefits. 8 U.S.C. 1611 and 1641(c). The absence of limiting language, combined with Congress's intent to provide comprehensive support to victims, demonstrates that the exemption applies to all forms of public assistance, not just cash benefits. As Congress's prohibition on consideration of benefits for these victims is properly interpreted to include both cash and non-cash means-tested public benefits, DHS believes that it is proper to consider the receipt of both cash and non-cash means-tested public benefits for all other cases as part of the public charge inadmissibility determination under this final rule.

Comment: A commenter expressed concern that DHS is relying on a series of decades-old immigration statutes originating from the 1882 Immigration Act to justify stricter policies, stating that this represents an unjustifiable regression that conflicts with Congress's tailored framework in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).

Response: DHS disagrees that it is impermissibly relying on decades-old immigration statutes to justify this final rule. DHS notes that the public charge ground of inadmissibility as it exists today has deep roots in the earliest immigration laws, as explained in detail in the NPRM. 90 FR 52168, 52174-52180 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS's interpretation and application of the public charge inadmissibility ground in this rulemaking is properly guided by the more than centuries-old history of this provision, the current statutory language at section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), relevant case law, and Congress's express statements of national policy with respect to immigration and welfare. Where Congress has not materially altered the statutory framework, DHS is tasked with implementing the statute as written. Reliance on the historical and current statutory framework for the public charge ground of inadmissibility is legally appropriate.

Comment: Commenters expressed support for the proposed rule, stating that the rule better reflects congressional intent. In particular, one commenter stated that the definitions in the 2022 Final Rule were too rigid, artificially narrowed categories of public benefits considered, and frustrated Congress's intent that immigration policy discourage dependence on public resources. Another commenter stated that the rule returns the decision-making process to a more balanced, common-sense approach where the totality of the circumstances, not just one or two factors, may be considered.

Response: DHS notes that the 2022 Final Rule emphasized seven factors that must be considered, not one or two factors as the commenter indicated. However, DHS agrees otherwise with these commenters; this final rule better reflects congressional intent. First, the commenter is correct that the 2022 Final Rule unduly limited DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in PRWORA. See8 U.S.C. 1601. Second, DHS agrees that the 2022 Final Rule prevented DHS officers from considering all factors and information relevant to an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, as Congress intended. Indeed, the 2022 Final Rule created a framework under which officers were limited to considering seven factors (five required by statute) rather than being explicitly empowered to consider any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances.[59] As a result, DHS agrees that it is essential to remove these limiting regulations in order to follow congressional intent.[60]

DHS also agrees that while Congress identified five minimum factors officers must consider, Congress intended, and the courts have endorsed, that the totality of an individual alien's circumstances, not a rigid number of regulatory factors, should be taken into consideration when determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. Although the statute does not expressly include a totality of the circumstances test, this test “has been developed in several Service, BIA, and Attorney General decisions and has been codified in the Service regulations implementing the legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.” [61] Federal courts have also endorsed this “totality of the circumstances” test.[62] As a result, officers had made public charge inadmissibility determinations considering all facts and circumstances in the totality prior to the 2019 Final Rule and 2022 Final Rule. DHS will continue to do so, consistent with past precedent decisions, under this final rule.[63]

( printed page 45337)

Comment: One commenter said that the proposed rule ignores decades of practice and contradicts congressional intent. Another wrote that Congress did not intend for the public charge ground of inadmissibility to punish people for using temporary or supplemental assistance while others opined that Congress did not intend for officers to consider an infinite set of factors. One asserts that Congress's silence as to whether additional factors can or should be considered was not intended to permit consideration of infinite factors and that Congress did not intend the statute to include a “catch-all” provision. In their view, the language “at a minimum” in the statute does not imply contemplation of factors not listed because the must-consider factors are complemented by one additional item that may be considered—the Form I-864.

Response: DHS disagrees that this rule ignores or contradicts congressional intent. In fact, Congress made clear in PRWORA that aliens within the nation's borders should be self-sufficient and not dependent on public resources to meet their needs. As set forth in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge are inadmissible to the United States unless a statutory exception applies. While DHS agrees that the broader discretionary approach to public charge inadmissibility determinations resulting from this rule is a departure from the 1999, 2019, and 2022 public charge efforts, it notes Congress authorized the Secretary to determine how to implement this provision. The Secretary determined, as he is authorized to do, that DHS needs to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that reflect Congress's intent when it enacted section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA. Indeed, with this rulemaking, DHS returns to a standard permitting officers to consider any and all factors relevant to an individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, consistent with precedent.[64]

Additionally, DHS agrees Congress made clear that officers must consider certain factors; however, we disagree that those factors are a limited, structured framework with defined parameters. The statute lists the five factors DHS officers must consider “at a minimum,” language that clearly does not preclude the consideration of other factors. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). Congress created the broad, non-exhaustive, and discretionary framework DHS will follow upon rescission of the unduly rigid 2022 Final Rule. As discussed thoroughly in the NPRM, the Secretary determined the 2022 Final Rule is overly restrictive and prevents DHS officers from making public charge inadmissibility determinations that align with the longstanding national policy set by Congress. 90 FR 52168, 52189 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also disagrees that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will lead to potential consideration of infinite factors, as DHS will limit consideration to only relevant factors; i.e., factors bearing on an alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting, consistent with precedent decisions.[65]

Comment: Several commenters requested an extended comment period on the proposed rule, noting the 30-day comment period overlapping with a significant Federal holiday and arguing that that is not consistent with Federal law and the APA in particular, and stating the time provided was insufficient to respond to a rule of significant scope, lack of clarity, and potential impacts. A commenter remarked that the apparently rushed approach, combined with the lack of a replacement framework, suggests the rulemaking is driven by predetermined policy preferences not careful consideration of statutory requirements and practical implementation, while another asserted the compressed timeframe was an effort to curtail negative comments.

Commenters referenced longer public comment periods in DHS's past rulemaking efforts, including past public charge rules, as support for an extension and various comments requested between an additional 120 and 150 days (some for a total of 180 days) to enable sufficient time for all stakeholders, discussion and consideration of the data, and to provide comment on the potential impacts of the proposed rule. One commenter cited caselaw to support the insufficiency of a 30-day comment period, stating the purposes of “notice and comment requirements are `(1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial review.' ” [66]

Response: DHS believes the 30-day comment period provided an adequate opportunity for public input and declines to extend the comment period. DHS agrees with commenters regarding the purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking in that the APA is silent regarding the duration of public comment periods, and neither it nor relevant caselaw establish a minimum duration applicable in all cases. 5 U.S.C. 553. Often, agencies, including DHS in the past, provide a 60-day comment period consistent with the recommendation in Executive Order (E.O.) 12866, particularly when the rulemaking is broad, includes new policies not previously considered by the regulated public or has significant impacts on the regulated public. DHS emphasizes this final rule is not broad but narrow in scope since it only covers a single ground of inadmissibility. Further, it does not include new policies not previously considered by the regulated public since DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to the approach that guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades before the 1999 Interim Field Guidance. While a 30-day comment period was shorter than the 60 days recommended in E.O. 12866, DHS believes in this instance 30 days was sufficient for the public to review, consider, and comment on the proposed rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. DHS ( printed page 45338) notes that it received 5,882 public comments during the 30-day comment period,[67] including substantive, high-quality comments from attorneys, Federal, State, and local elected officials, and advocacy organizations who provided detailed information and, in some instances, raised significant issues to which DHS is responding in this final rule. As such, an extension of the comment period would not have been helpful or necessary.

As stated in the NPRM, DHS believes it is in the best interest of the United States and its citizens to ensure public benefits do not create an incentive for immigration contrary to the INA and PRWORA. In acting expeditiously to remove regulations requiring officers to ignore the receipt of a large swath of public benefits when making public charge inadmissibility determinations, DHS is returning the public charge ground of inadmissibility to the congressional intent underlying the INA, IIRIRA, and PRWORA.

Finally, DHS strongly disagrees it provided a shorter comment period to curtail negative public comments or failed to adequately consider practical impacts of the rulemaking in favor of predetermined policy preferences. As discussed in this preamble, during the comment period, DHS received a number of comments opposing the proposed rule. In addition to carefully explaining and addressing the anticipated impacts of the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule in the NPRM, DHS has carefully considered and here responds to public comments in this final rule.

DHS agrees with commenters, however, that every agency rulemaking reflects the policy objectives of the administration which initiated the rulemaking and reflects the will of the American people who elected the public officials heading a particular administration. So too, in this case, this rulemaking reflects current policy objectives. DHS published a proposed rule, carefully considered the public comments received, and provided substantive responses, in full compliance with the APA.

Comment: Several commenters requested DHS commit to developing future public charge inadmissibility standards through transparent notice-and-comment rulemaking, not solely through subregulatory policy tools. Several commenters stated, if DHS decides to develop an alternative rule, it must be open to full public notice and comment along with any guidance or tools created to direct officers' decisions. Multiple commenters said asking for open-ended feedback and recommendations on what to include in such tools is not a substitute for notice and comment.

Response: As indicated in the NPRM and other comment responses, DHS is not issuing regulations governing public charge inadmissibility determinations. DHS is removing regulatory provisions that unduly hampered officers when making inadmissibility determinations. USCIS will issue nonbinding subregulatory guidance that will go into effect on the effective date of this final rule. This guidance will be a general statement of policy that will not have the force and effect of law and will thus be exempt from notice and comment rulemaking. USCIS plans to include the new guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual, which is available on the USCIS website, is transparent to the public, and will replace the existing guidance reflecting the 2022 Final Rule. If regulations are needed or would be helpful to the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility in the future, DHS will comply with the APA requirements in issuing any such regulations.

Comment: Several commenters objected to eliminating regulatory standards in favor of undefined policy and interpretive tools without notice-and-comment rulemaking, arguing it denies the public a meaningful opportunity to review the adjudication standards and likely violates the APA. The commenters cited Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association [68] and Mendoza v. Perez [69] to warn subregulatory guidance cannot create new substantive standards, alter statutory requirements, or expand adjudicator discretion in ways that affect rights. They stated that public charge inadmissibility determinations require clear, publicly vetted regulations, not internal guidance, and warned relying on future guidance would invite inconsistent, arbitrary USCIS decisions across offices, leave families uncertain which programs are safe to use, and chill participation in health, nutrition, and housing supports. Commenters urged DHS to withdraw the rulemaking or clarify its intentions, develop the rule internally, and reissue a more detailed proposed rule or a new NPRM if substantive changes are intended, noting that bypassing the APA would allow continual policy shifts without public input and create ongoing uncertainty.

Response: DHS disagrees that this rule will lead to arbitrary outcomes and that any future guidance will alter statutory requirements or conflict with the APA and related case law. DHS will not withdraw the NPRM, and is issuing this final rule to conclude the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. DHS also disagrees that any clarification of its intentions is needed. The NPRM was explicit about rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and freeing officers from arbitrary and undue limitations on the exercise of congressionally-authorized discretion. DHS is committed to following the law, including the APA, and does not intend to issue regulations or promulgate substantive rules through subregulatory guidance without notice and comment rulemaking.

As discussed in other comment responses, the subregulatory guidance USCIS publishes in the USCIS Policy Manual will guide, but not prescribe, public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule in the context of adjustment of status applications. This guidance will explain how officers will be able to consider the receipt of any means-tested public benefits by the alien and will ensure officers fully consider this and any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances, as Congress intended.

Comment: Commenters supported the creation of appropriate interpretive tools, but said these should supplement, not supplant, Federal regulations, requesting regulations not be removed until after such tools are developed and any timeline appropriately reflect a period for soliciting and incorporating public input on these tools before they are finalized. Another commenter said instead of including details of the policies or interpretative tools in the NPRM, DHS elected to issue a “vague” NPRM and issue the tools later, which likely violates the APA at 5 U.S.C. 533 because the public is entitled to notice and comment rulemaking on impactful matters, especially those implicating the potential use of public benefits. Commenters asserted DHS should withdraw the NPRM because it cannot radically expand the definition of “public charge” without explicitly proposing a new public charge rule subject to notice and comment. Commenters stated that interpretive tools must undergo the full notice-and- ( printed page 45339) comment process, citing Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA [70] and General Electric Co. v. EPA,[71] noting soliciting feedback is not a substitute for notice and comment. They claimed that without clearer guidance, it would be very difficult to advise clients on the potential public charge implications of certain public benefits.

Other commenters said the 2025 NPRM explicitly seeks a return to policies similar to the 2019 Final Rule, while attempting an end-run around the APA's notice-and-comment requirements, noting to justify a new substantive public charge rule, DHS must go through the full APA-mandated process, as the first Trump Administration did in 2018-2019 and the Biden Administration did in 2022. The commenters warned simply rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and replacing it with “appropriate policy and interpretive tools” ( i.e., not a “legislative rule” under the APA) would be a clear violation of statute with no purpose other than haste and avoidance of public comment. A few commenters requested DHS use the full notice-and-comment process for any policy or tools in public charge determinations, clearly reaffirm any changes would apply only prospectively (in acknowledgement of the reliance interests) and not penalize individuals who relied in good faith on prior rules.

Response: As indicated in the responses above, DHS disagrees with these commenters because the NPRM was not vague; rather, it clearly explained the changes DHS was considering and the reasoning behind them. DHS will not issue substantive rules without notice and comment rulemaking. Further, DHS is not making an “end run” around the APA's notice and comment requirements. As explained in the NPRM and elsewhere in this final rule, there are some substantive differences between the 2019 Final Rule and this final rule. For example, the 2019 Final Rule limited officer discretion. Specifically, the 2019 final rule included strict definitions, such as the term “likely at any time to become a public charge.” This definition included a new dependence threshold. The 2019 Final Rule also included regular and heavily weighted factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, and specific exclusions from consideration of certain public benefits (when such benefits were received by certain populations). DHS now finds this limited discretion is not aligned with Congressional intent. USCIS will issue guidance for officers to consider when making individualized public charge inadmissibility determinations, consistent with the INA and established precedent. The APA's notice and comment requirements apply to legislative rules but not to interpretative rules or general statements of policy. See5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). The Supreme Court has long recognized the distinction.[72] Interpretive rules or general statements of policy are lawful so long as they do not impose new rights or obligations or bind agency decisionmakers.[73] DHS disagrees that the guidance and interpretive tools it plans to issue would fail under Appalachian Power or General Electric because in those cases the guidance used mandatory language, left no room for agency discretion, imposed concrete regulatory obligations, the regulated parties reasonably believed that noncompliance would trigger enforcement, and they had no realistic alternative but compliance.[74]

DHS has determined regulations are unnecessary for the effective implementation of the public charge ground of inadmissibility and will not issue replacement regulations at this time. DHS believes the statute and applicable precedent decisions that guided the public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guideposts for determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. DHS also disagrees that it would be possible or appropriate to delay the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule pending the issuance of new agency guidance because absent a rescission of existing regulations, USCIS would be bound by the prior administration's policies reflected in that regulatory framework when issuing subregulatory guidance to officers. By removing the 2022 Final Rule, DHS is reestablishing officer discretion within the existing statutory and precedential framework. Any guidance that USCIS issues will not amount to a binding rule but rather guide USCIS officer discretion in the context of adjustment of status applications without limiting it or prescribing adjudicatory outcomes.

Comment: A commenter warned DHS cannot lawfully rescind binding regulations and substitute undisclosed subregulatory guidance to effect substantive policy changes while avoiding public participation and judicial review, noting that a November 6, 2025, Department of State (DOS) cable to consular posts broadened the public charge factors and evidence for visa adjudications. The commenter said the cable reportedly directs officers to deny visas unless applicants affirmatively show they will never become a public charge; treats non-cash benefits, charitable aid, and other lawful support as potential evidence of inadmissibility; and deepens financial scrutiny (previewing Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) updates) forcing applicants to produce extensive financial documentation and imposing disproportionate burdens on low-income, credit-thin, intermittently employed, or unstably housed individuals, an outcome the commenter contended plainly violates the APA.

Response: DHS refers commenters to DOS on the issue of the DOS cable and the FAM. With respect to the evidentiary burden applicable to aliens seeking adjustment of status with USCIS after the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, DHS has proposed changes to the Form I-485 and disclosed the relevant paperwork burden estimate on which the public was invited to comment in conjunction with this rulemaking during the applicable 60-day comment period consistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) and implementing regulations. 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.,5 CFR part 1320. As with all other adjudications, should USCIS officers require more evidence or clarification of information or evidence included with the Form I-485, USCIS may issue Requests for Evidence (RFEs) or Notices of Intent to Deny (NOIDs).

Comment: One commenter stated if DHS invoked the APA's good-cause exception to bypass notice-and-comment or the 30-day delayed effective date, it is improper for a rule of this scope absent a genuine, immediate emergency, since courts construe good cause narrowly; administrative convenience or policy urgency does not suffice.

Response: When issuing this final rule, DHS did not invoke the good cause exception to the APA's notice and comment requirements but rather published a proposed rule with a 30-day ( printed page 45340) comment period, and is publishing this final rule with a 60-day effective date, as required by the Congressional Review Act and in compliance with the APA which requires a minimum of 30 days. See5 U.S.C. 553 and 5 U.S.C. 801-808.

Comment: Multiple commenters asserted the NPRM should be struck down under 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because the APA requires a reasoned explanation for rescinding or changing an existing rule beyond just a new administration. Some commenters asserted the rule is arbitrary and capricious due to the lack of a sufficient justification for DHS's changed position, the likelihood of inconsistent agency interpretations, and the failure to consider reliance interests stemming from prior rules and guidance. Citing to the litigation on the 2019 Final Rule, the commenters added the rule would also be inconsistent with the INA and it departs from the well-settled meaning of public charge. Another commenter stated, under basic principles of administrative law, “reasoned decision making” requires agencies to rely on expertise and coherent standards, not unguided intuition.

Response: DHS disagrees with commenters that the NPRM or this final rule is arbitrary and capricious. Importantly, DHS is not providing a definition for public charge in this final rule. Moreover, there is no single well-settled meaning of the term public charge that definitively includes the consideration of some public benefits but not others, notwithstanding the caselaw commenters cite.[75] As discussed in the NPRM, the INA does not define “public charge” or “likely at any time to become a public charge.” Instead, Congress provided a framework of non-exhaustive minimum factors for consideration (age, health, family status, assets, resources, and financial status, and education and skills and left it to the agency's discretion to determine whether an alien is inadmissible under the ground. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(A) and (B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A) and (B); 90 FR 52168, 52186, 52187-88, 52175 (Nov. 19, 2025).

Administrative and judicial precedent decisions have consistently recognized the public charge inadmissibility determination is inherently subjective and discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the alien's circumstances. DHS notes these precedent decisions predate both the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and the regulatory definitions promulgated in 2019 and 2022. As indicated in Matter of Harutunian, the elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied; they are not defined by statute but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting. 14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974). Similarly, as stated in Matter of Martinez-Lopez, the statute “requires more than a showing of a possibility that the alien will require public support. Some specific circumstance . . . must be present.” 10 I&N Dec. 409, 421-22 (BIA 1962; Att'y Gen. 1964). Finally, as stated in Matter of A-, the “traditional test . . . is `a prediction based on the totality of the alien's circumstances' as presented in the individual case.” 19 I&N Dec. 867, 869 (BIA 1988) (citation omitted).

As DHS noted in the NPRM, there has never been a single, uniform, or “well settled” definition of public charge. 90 FR 52168, 52174 (Nov. 19, 2025). Instead, the meaning evolved over time and has been subject to varying administrative interpretations. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1950 noted: “[s]ince the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination . . . rests within the discretion of the consular officers or [INS].” 90 FR 52168, 52181 (Nov. 19, 2025). Certain circuit courts recognized the statute grants the executive “extensive and ultimate discretion” and the term “public charge” does not have a fixed historical meaning.[76] Finally, as stated in the NPRM, past agency guidance and practice in place before the 2019 Final Rule, including the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and prior administrative decisions, have always emphasized a flexible, fact-specific approach, not a rigid or narrow definition. Congress, in enacting PRWORA and IIRIRA, did not codify a specific definition but instead reinforced the officer's discretion to consider all relevant evidence. 90 FR 52168, 52182-83, 52188-89 (Nov. 19, 2025). For these reasons, rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and restoring broader officer discretion is not arbitrary and capricious; it is not contrary to a well-settled meaning of public charge, because no such settled meaning exists.

In addition, DHS disagrees this rule is arbitrary and capricious because it lacks justification or a reasoned explanation. DHS agrees that, under FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009), a change in agency regulations requires a reasoned explanation: the agency must acknowledge the change, provide good reasons for it, and indicate why it believes the new position is better. DHS satisfied these requirements in the NPRM and in this final rule.

DHS explicitly acknowledged it was proposing to rescind the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations established by the 2022 Final Rule and consistently provided good reasons for the proposed rescission.[77] DHS provided detailed, reasoned explanations for the change, including explaining the 2022 Final Rule is not the best implementation of the statute, is inconsistent with congressional intent, is unduly restrictive, and hampers DHS's ability to make accurate, precise, and reliable determinations. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). While rescinding the 2022 Final Rule is a departure—in varying degrees—from the three prior efforts over the last 27 years related to the public charge ground of inadmissibility, DHS is not required to retain any of the prior regulations and policy guidance the Secretary determined, upon a review of guidance and public-facing information dating back to 1946, are not the best way to implement the expansive, fact-specific, totality of the circumstances, and discretionary public charge inadmissibility determination Congress put into place. See90 FR 52168, 52181-82 (Nov. 19, 2025).

The NPRM further stated the 2022 Final Rule straitjackets DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are ( printed page 45341) consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the PRWORA by limiting what public benefits DHS can consider in the totality of the circumstances and by precluding officers from considering factors beyond the seven factors outlined in the regulations. 90 FR 52168, 52169-52170 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also explained that both the 2019 and 2022 rules provided a finite list of factors officers are required to consider without providing officers the authority to consider other factors relevant in any individual case, which is inconsistent with the discretionary and case-specific framework Congress intended. 90 FR 52168, 52180-52181 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS also explained why it believes that public charge inadmissibility determinations after the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will be more consistent with congressional intent. Specifically, DHS noted that officers will be able to use good judgment and discretion to make highly individualized, fact-specific, case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions based on the totality of each alien's individual circumstances, rather than being limited by rigid regulatory definitions and standards. 90 FR 52168, 52194 (Nov. 19, 2025). Crucially, DHS explained that the 2022 Final Rule's approach including the primary dependence standard may have resulted in USCIS finding aliens eligible for adjustment of status even when their past receipt of means-tested public benefits may have demonstrated they lacked self-sufficiency and were likely at any time to become a public charge, due to officers' inability to consider all benefits the alien depended on and any other relevant case-specific factor that has bearing on the inadmissibility determination. 90 FR 52168, 52180 (Nov. 19, 2025). In fact, DHS provided multiple reasons to support the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. 90 FR 52168, 52180-81, 52186 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS also discussed the underlying reasons for past policies, including their limitations in the NPRM. Specifically, DHS noted that both the 2019 Final Rule and 2022 Final Rule attempted to provide clarity and predictability by specifying a finite list of factors and benefits to be considered in public charge determinations, however in so doing these rules “severely and unduly limited the factors that DHS could consider in making a public charge inadmissibility determination,” which is inconsistent with the broad, discretionary standard Congress intended. 90 FR 52168, 52180-81 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS also discussed the 2019 Final Rule in various parts of the NPRM and determined that it was not a truly viable alternative, because, while closer to congressional intent behind section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA, that rule also prescribed a rigid and complex regulatory scheme that unnecessarily constrained officer discretion.

Furthermore, in proposing the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, DHS also provided a thorough review of statutory history, prior administrative practice, and case law, and explained the new approach is grounded in the agency's expertise and longstanding precedent.[78] Finally, DHS acknowledged the existence of reliance interests and specifically requested comments on what aspects of the 2022 Final Rule might have engendered such reliance interests, and how DHS should best address such reliance interests given its stated policy objectives. 90 FR 52168, 52193 (Nov. 19, 2025). In this final rule, DHS is responding to public comments raising specific reliance interests and has made clarifications in this final rule to further address those interests.

For all of these reasons, DHS has established why the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is reasonable given the broad congressional delegation, and the fact that there is no settled meaning of public charge. DHS has provided a detailed, reasoned explanation for the change, identified the deficiencies in the prior rules, explained why the new approach is preferable, and addressed reliance interests and the need for coherent, expertise-driven discretionary determinations.

Comment: Some commenters stated expanding the public charge inadmissibility framework so broadly—to potentially encompass working U.S. citizens with income—lacks historical or rational support and would be arbitrary and capricious. Citing the Supreme Court's requirement in FCC v. Fox Television that agencies justify disregarding prior facts and reliance interests, commenters noted the proposal offers no evidence the 2022 Rule is unworkable or inconsistent with the INA, identifies no enforcement problems or data, and fails to account for the chilling effects on immigrants, domestic violence- survivors, and nonprofit service providers. One commenter stated the Supreme Court addressed the very issue of rescinding automobile safety standards without promulgating new regulations in the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (“ State Farm ”), finding it to be arbitrary and capricious. Several commenters warned DHS has not provided the necessary justification for abandoning longstanding interpretations or for why the codified provisions of the 2022 Final Rule could not instead be modified in response to H.R.1.

Response: DHS disagrees that the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious or lacks a reasonable basis or sufficient explanation. As detailed above, DHS provided an ample reasonable basis for removing the 2022 Final Rule, explained removing the rule restores officer discretion, and aligns the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility closer to the congressional intent. Neither State Farm [79] nor FCC v. Fox Television [80] requires DHS to establish the 2022 Final Rule is unworkable or that it is inconsistent with the INA. The Supreme Court in FCC v. Fox Television held an agency does not need to show its prior policy or interpretation is unworkable to justify a change, explaining an agency may change its policy as long as it provides a reasoned explanation for the change, acknowledges the shift, and addresses any reliance interests.[81] The Court specifically rejected the requirement for heightened justification, stating an agency “need not demonstrate. . .that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.” [82] Instead, the agency must simply explain the new policy and why it believes it is preferable.[83] This principle allows agencies flexibility to adapt and revise policies without being constrained by the workability or enforceability of previous approaches.[84] All of this being said, DHS believes it established in the NPRM the 2022 Final Rule was not the best interpretation of the statute and not fully consistent with congressional intent.

Similarly, DHS is not required to establish the 2022 Final Rule was ( printed page 45342) unenforceable, although DHS clearly stated in the NPRM the approach taken in the 2022 Final Rule (as also reflected in the 1999 Interim Field Guidance) inappropriately required officers to ignore a large swath of means-tested public benefits in public charge inadmissibility determinations and exclude the possibility of future dependence on such benefits as part of the overall framework. DHS strongly disagrees that it ignored reliance interests or facts underlying the promulgation of the 2022 Final Rule.

As articulated in the NPRM, DHS grappled with prior factual findings underlying the 2022 Final Rule particularly as it pertains to self-sufficiency and whether considering receipt of means-tested public benefits can be indicative of a lack of self-sufficiency, as well as collateral impacts of the rulemaking, such as chilling effects. 90 FR at 52183, 52208-10. To that end, DHS provided an adequate legal and policy justification for changing course given its interests to further the statutory purpose behind the public charge ground of inadmissibility and PRWORA by reducing the incentive for aliens who are not self-sufficient and are likely to become dependent on the government to enter or remain in the United States. Congress has established multiple statutory tools to reduce such dependence. PRWORA and other statutes significantly restricted the eligibility of aliens for public benefits. The public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportability are other tools Congress created to advance these national policy objectives regarding aliens' self-sufficiency. Though an alien may be eligible to receive public benefits, Congress established consequences for such receipt by those aliens. If they become a public charge within 5 years after entry, they may be removed from the United States. INA sec. 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(5). Congress clearly intended these immigration consequences to disincentivize the receipt of public benefits by aliens.

This rule advances the clear national policy concerning welfare and immigration by making it possible for officers to more accurately assess whether, in their opinion, an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge.

While this policy objective differs from the prior administration's objectives, DHS has permissibly reevaluated the relevant facts and provided a reasoned explanation for its new policy. DHS therefore disagrees that the rule is arbitrary and capricious.[85]

In addition, DHS finds the specific circumstances in State Farm to be distinguishable. Congress granted the Secretary broad discretion to administer the public charge ground of inadmissibility, provided only certain mandatory factors for consideration in individual cases, and at no point directed the Secretary to engage in rulemaking or establish binding standards to govern the public charge ground of inadmissibility. In contrast, Congress when wishing to improve motor vehicle and traffic safety by enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, (NTMVS Act), 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq. (1976 and Supp. IV 1980) directed the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate to issue motor vehicle safety standards and also mandated those standards be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms. 15 U.S.C. 1392(a).[86] Congress also directed that in issuing these standards, the Secretary must consider relevant available motor vehicle safety data, whether the proposed standard is reasonable, practicable and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle, and the “extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes” of the NTMVS Act. 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1), (3), (4).[87] See State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983). Therefore, when the Secretary of Transportation rescinded the seatbelt regulation without requiring either the use of airbags or seat belts, or considering alternatives, the court determined this approach was arbitrary and capricious because National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ignored the statutory requirement to enhance safety and failed to consider reasonable alternatives. Id. at 46-57.

In the case of this rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, while DHS has the statutory authority to issue regulations or guidance (or both) to administer the public charge ground of inadmissibility in its discretion, it is not required by statute to issue regulations or guidance. INA sec. 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3). Furthermore, in the NPRM and this final rule, DHS has made it clear that USCIS will administer the ground of inadmissibility consistent with the statute and applicable precedent, and any USCIS guidance will guide but not prescribe officer discretion. This approach is consistent with INS' approach for most of the time this ground of inadmissibility existed. DHS only opted to issue binding regulations for the first time in 2019. As discussed in the NPRM and this final rule, DHS explained why retaining the 2022 Final Rule or returning to the 2019 Final Rule would not accomplish its objectives, and explained why DHS believes this rule is better, is more aligned with congressional intent and purpose, and fulfills its policy objective. 90 FR at 52180. Therefore, the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is distinguishable from the rescission of the vehicle and traffic safety standards by the NHTSA in State Farm.

With respect to comments stating DHS did not explain why the regulations could not be modified in response to H.R. 1, DHS is unclear what the commenters meant. While H.R. 1 narrowed eligibility for SNAP and imposed limits on federal matching payments for full Medicaid benefits, subject to certain exceptions,[88] it is unclear how or why DHS should have considered amending public charge regulations in line with H.R. 1.

Comment: A commenter said DHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to define vague statutory terms that it would be applying in individual cases, by transgressing the “fundamental norm of administrative procedure [that] requires an agency to treat like cases alike,” and by postponing guidance indefinitely and leaving individual DHS officers with no objective standard to follow. Another commenter agreed and said the NPRM's complete lack of guidance is arbitrary and capricious because it is vague, precludes individuals from knowing how to comply, while asserting the following terms are used multiple times throughout the NPRM without providing definitions: means-tested public benefit, public benefits, public benefit program, benefits, and public resources.

Response: DHS disagrees that this final rule is arbitrary and capricious because it does not codify definitions of certain terms implicated in making ( printed page 45343) public charge inadmissibility determinations. DHS does not believe it is necessary to define the terms referenced, noting prior to the 2019 Final Rule officers successfully applied the 1999 Interim Field Guidance; and prior to 1999, officers similarly applied the statute, precedent decisions, and applicable agency guidance to make reasonable case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions without binding regulatory definitions. In fact, there were no codified definitions governing the public charge inadmissibility determination from 1882 until the 2019 Final Rule. As noted in other responses, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance that will go into effect on the effective date of this final rule to assist officers with applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility.

DHS agrees it used certain terms interchangeably in the NPRM and agrees consistent use of terms is preferable. When referring to public benefits and/or resources, DHS in all cases meant means-tested public benefits and when referring to public benefit programs, DHS intended to refer to Federal, State, territorial, Tribal, and local programs that provide means-tested public benefits. DHS does not believe that codifying a definition of means-tested public benefits is necessary as that term is generally understood to refer to a government program or benefit where eligibility is based on an individual's or family's income and/or assets falling below a specific threshold.[89]

Comment: Commenters said the NPRM is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to cogently explain why participation in public benefit programs that improve health, educational, and financial stability, or are otherwise supplemental not necessary for subsistence or not indicative of a lack of self-sufficiency, is relevant to the public charge inadmissibility determination. One commenter said DHS ignores the data and evidence relied on in promulgating the 2022 Rule showing receipt of supplemental benefits is associated with increased employment and self-sufficiency. The other commenter indicated that the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion, observing many covered benefits are supplemental rather than primary resources. The commenter wrote that both courts recognized a crucial distinction between using benefits to supplement one's life and using them due to lack of self-sufficiency, and asserted the NPRM made no such distinction as PRWORA requires, leaving DHS unable to “show that there are good reasons” for the policy and risking another arbitrary and capricious ruling.

Response: DHS disagrees it failed to explain how participation in certain public benefit programs is relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations or failed to consider the evidence or policy considerations underlying the 2022 Final Rule. While DHS did not directly address the data and evidence from the 2022 Final Rule about the relationship between receipt of certain benefits and employment and self-sufficiency referenced by commenters in the NPRM, DHS's underlying rationale for this rulemaking makes such discussion superfluous because DHS is not promulgating a dependence threshold or making an alien inadmissible exclusively based on the receipt of one or more public benefits. Similarly, DHS is not drawing distinctions between public benefits based on whether they merely subsidize an alien's life or provide for the alien's basic needs, nor is DHS disputing the fact that some means-tested public benefits assist aliens on the path to self-sufficiency. Rather, DHS is engaging in this rulemaking to bring the public charge ground of inadmissibility in line with congressional intent and purpose and to ensure that all inadmissibility determinations are made by officers in the totality of the alien's circumstances and that officers are empowered to consider all relevant information and evidence, including the full universe of benefits aliens may have received and the circumstances surrounding such receipt. In administering the public charge ground of inadmissibility DHS must ensure that it does not permit aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge to be admitted or adjust their status to that of an LPR. In the NPRM, DHS referenced precedent and recent court opinions providing support for the premise that receiving means-tested public benefits is relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations. See90 FR 52168, 52186-87 (Nov. 19, 2025). Furthermore, DHS believes that officers will consider the relative importance of the alien's receipt of any particular means-tested public benefit in the totality of the circumstances and will provide training and guidance to support accurate adjudications. With the 2022 Final Rule removed, officers will be able to consider whether the alien: received means-tested public benefits for only a short period of time, received small dollar amounts of assistance, received any particular public benefit rendering the alien dependent on the benefit, received means-tested public benefits permanently or temporarily, and has good overall prospects for being and remaining self-sufficient.

DHS disagrees that PRWORA created a distinction in the context of public charge inadmissibility determinations between means-tested public benefits denoting a lack of self-sufficiency and benefits merely supplementing an alien's lifestyle. PRWORA outlined the national policy objectives for the role of public benefits and eligibility for the same, specifying eligibility rules based on public benefit types and an alien's immigration status, including establishing exceptions from such eligibility rules. 8 U.S.C. 1601, et seq. DHS agrees the Seventh Circuit in Cook County v. Wolf found it failed to explain why it changed its longstanding policy of excluding non-cash benefits from the public charge inadmissibility determination, but the Seventh Circuit did not hold the consideration of such benefits was de facto arbitrary and capricious.[90] Similarly, the Second Circuit in Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli also focused on DHS's explanation for considering non-cash public benefits rather than finding such consideration was de facto unreasonable.[91] DHS believes these cases are distinguishable from this rule. The 2019 Final Rule approach treated the receipt of any included public benefits as having the same consequences as long as the durational threshold (12 months or more) was met. The 2019 Final Rule not only provided for the consideration of non-cash benefits but also prescribed heavy weight in the totality of the circumstances to certain circumstances surrounding the receipt of any one ( printed page 45344) public benefit (regardless of type); this Final Rule does not do that.

Comment: A commenter said the proposed rule offers no evidence to support DHS's “belie[f] that any prior receipt of means-tested public benefits is a key gauge to determining the likelihood of future dependence on the government for subsistence” and the fundamental flaw of DHS's justification is it does not provide any factual basis for this belief. The commenter reasoned the goals and eligibility criteria of these benefits programs belie DHS's assumption and show these programs are designed to provide supplemental support to a broad swath of the population, as INS recognized in 1999.

Response: DHS believes the commenter misunderstood DHS's proposal to remove the 2022 Final Rule and the impact on public charge inadmissibility determinations in expanding the consideration of a broader universe of public benefits. The NPRM did not state that considering a broader universe of public benefits would result in aliens de facto being found inadmissible under the public charge ground or the removal of the 2022 Final Rule would elevate the importance of receipt of means-tested public benefits in public charge inadmissibility determinations. To the contrary, DHS cited to precedent decisions holding receipt of public benefits is not in itself outcome determinative [92] and highlighted that the past receipt of means-tested public benefits is one consideration in the totality of the circumstances.[93] As discussed in other comment responses, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance to help its officers determine how to best consider the alien's current and past receipt of means-tested public benefits in the totality of the circumstances.

Comment: One commenter said by proposing to remove regulatory guidance related to public charge inadmissibility, DHS undermines a shared understanding of the law and its meaning. The commenter stated that the adjudicatory standards DHS proposes to erase are necessary to fair, transparent, and consistent application of law, and warned that all stakeholders must understand when and to whom the public charge rule does and does not apply, yet DHS proposes to remove the regulations explaining applicability, exemptions, and waivers.

Response: DHS agrees the regulated public should understand how and to whom the public charge ground of inadmissibility applies. As explained in the NPRM and other responses to comments, DHS believes the statute and applicable precedent decisions that guided the public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guideposts for determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. However, to ensure transparency and consistent adjudications, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance that will explain how officers, under this final rule, will be able to consider the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits and will ensure officers fully consider this and any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances, as Congress intended.

With respect to concerns that the removal from DHS regulations of the list of exemptions and waivers is arbitrary and capricious, as stated in the NPRM, these exemptions are statutory and will not be impacted by the removal of the regulations. 90 FR 52168, 52192 (Nov. 19, 2025). In order to provide a convenient reference point for the regulated public as to the exemptions and waivers, DHS will retain the list on the USCIS website, in the USCIS Policy Manual, and on the Form I-485.

Comment: Some commenters responded to DHS's request regarding which aspects of the 2022 Final Rule engendered reliance interests. Commenters identified key elements that engendered reliance interests:

Response: DHS thanks the commenters for these specific examples. While DHS is adopting the proposed rescission of the regulations promulgated by the 2022 Final Rule without change, DHS has provided clarifications in this final rule in response to public comments to address some of these potential reliance interests. This approach is consistent with DHS' understanding of Congress's national policy objectives. DHS notes that given the regulatory changes since 2019, and subsequent litigation challenging the 2019 and 2022 Final Rules, the current reliance interests of the regulated public are not as significant as the reliance interests of the regulated public at the time the 1999 Interim Field Guidance was superseded with the 2019 Final Rule because the regulated public was placed on notice by recurring rulemakings and litigation of the significant differences in policy objectives and approaches among administrations when it comes to the public charge ground of inadmissibility.[94]

For reliance interests engendered by the 2022 Final Rule's limitations on the consideration of benefits outside of public cash assistance for income maintenance and long-term institutionalization at government's expense, DHS clarified that once this final rule goes into effect, there will be no limit on which means-tested public benefits officers can consider for benefits received on or after the effective date of the rule. However, with the exception of Medicaid-funded services for long-term institutionalization, officers will not consider non-cash public benefits received before the effective date of this final rule (including any information in the record that the alien applied for, was certified or approved to receive public benefits before the effective date of this final rule). However, where the evidence reflects that the alien has been approved or certified to receive benefits for a ( printed page 45345) period that extends beyond the effective date of this final rule, if the alien does not provide evidence of disenrollment from such benefits or that he or she withdrew such application or notified the relevant agencies he or she no longer wanted to receive the benefits, DHS would consider the application, certification, and receipt of such benefits in the totality of the circumstances that occurs on or after the effective date of the final rule. For a more detailed discussion of the prospective application of this rule, please see section III.D.5. of this final rule's preamble.

For the definition of receipt and the statement that applications for, or receipt of benefits by family members should not be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination, DHS did not propose nor does this final rule direct officers to consider information about an alien's family member's receipt of public benefits, unless that family member is applying for admission or adjustment of status and is subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility. As such, DHS will generally not consider the application for, certification or approval to receive, or receipt of public benefits by the alien's family members. As discussed in other comment responses, DHS considers the alien's income as part of the mandatory assets, resources, and financial status factor, and if there is evidence in the record the alien's family members whom the alien is legally obligated to support receive means-tested public benefits based on the alien's income falling below the designated threshold, DHS would consider that fact as part of the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances. Given the alien must exclude any income received from means-tested public benefits from household income information provided on the Form I-485, the inclusion of amounts received from means-tested public benefits by others in the household as household income may lead to an inadmissibility finding under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

For comments expressing concern regarding the consideration of means-tested public benefits while in a status not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility, DHS believes these reliance interests are at least partially addressed by clarifying means-tested public benefits not previously considered under the 2022 Final Rule will also not be considered if received before the effective date of this final rule. DHS notes many aliens who received means-tested public benefits while in categories exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility are also able to adjust their status to that of LPR in a category similarly exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility ( e.g., T and U nonimmigrants and VAWA beneficiaries). For aliens who adjust under a different category, or aliens who cannot adjust under an exempt category, DHS notes, without the unduly rigid framework of the 2022 Final Rule, officers can consider the specific circumstances in which public benefits were received. Officers may give limited weight to the receipt of such benefits, examining any public policy considerations underlying the alien's eligibility for them, along with other factors officers normally consider in the totality of the circumstances; such as (but not limited to) duration or amount of receipt, whether circumstances leading to receipt were temporary or permanent, alien's age, health, family status, work prospects, etc.

Finally, DHS notes that prior to the 2019 Final Rule, under the 1999 Interim Field Guidance, there was no limitation on the consideration of means-tested public benefits received while in an exempt category. If an alien received public cash assistance or long-term institutionalization at government's expense while in a status exempt from public charge and subsequently sought to adjust status to an LPR in a category subject to public charge, such receipt could be considered in the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, the approach DHS is taking now is consistent with past agency practice, and DHS's interest in taking a consistent approach across immigration categories outweighs any remaining reliance interests from the 2022 Final Rule.

The last element of reliance identified—that information included on non-cash benefits applications would not be shared or used for immigration purposes—DHS notes that the 2022 Final Rule excluded from consideration the applications, approval or certification to receive, or receipt of non-cash benefits, but it did not address information sharing between benefit providing agencies and DHS in this context. DHS did not propose nor does this final rule address any information sharing between agencies. Therefore, this portion of the comment is out of scope.

Comment: Commenters said the NPRM disregarded reliance interests, noting families, advocacy groups, and service providers relied on the 2022 Final Rule's clarity when enrolling in health, nutrition, and housing programs. Commenters stated that unclear Federal direction undermines federalism and State reliance interests, disrupts extensive State and local networks, and risks worsening public health and fiscal outcomes by deterring use of programs like Medicaid, SNAP, and early childhood supports. These commenters stated that agencies failing to account for reliance interests raises serious concerns about retroactivity, arbitrary decision-making, and unequal treatment of applicants. Another commenter agreed and said that DHS must not only identify reliance interests or invite public input on them but it must meaningfully consider and weigh the reliance interests when reversing prior policy and explain why they do not want a different policy outcome. Commenters stated that merely soliciting comments about reliance after announcing wholesale rescission of the operative framework is not the “reasoned explanation” with “awareness” of reliance interests required by the Supreme Court. Commenters cited Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, where the Supreme Court emphasized agencies must consider the “reliance interests” fostered in changing policy, and found that failure to do so can render an action arbitrary and capricious under the APA.

Response: DHS disagrees that the NPRM disregarded any reliance interests or that the NPRM or this final rule reflects unclear Federal direction. In the NPRM, DHS specifically described prior rulemakings and requested feedback regarding specific reliance interests. DHS considered comments and supporting information provided, including narrative explanations from aliens, immigration service providers, State and local governments, etc., consistent with Supreme Court precedent.[95]

DHS disagrees that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule adversely impacts federalism or disrupts State reliance interests. While DHS agrees aliens may have relied on the 2022 Final Rule when enrolling in certain means-tested public benefit programs, DHS addressed those ( printed page 45346) reliance interests by clarifying previously excluded benefits are excluded from consideration if received before the effective date of this rule (including any information in the record that the alien applied for, was certified or approved to receive public benefits before the effective date of this final rule) where the alien can provide evidence he or she disenrolled from such benefits, or in the case of application, certification or approval to receive means-tested public benefits, the alien withdrew such application or notified the relevant agencies he or she no longer wanted to receive the benefits. For a more detailed discussion of the prospective application of this rule, please see section III.D.5. of this final rule's preamble. DHS also repeatedly stated the receipt of means-tested public benefits alone is not outcome determinative in public charge inadmissibility determinations and explained in the NPRM and throughout this final rule that the nature of the discretionary determination after this final rule goes into effect takes into consideration all evidence relevant to an alien's case including the circumstances surrounding benefit receipt.

DHS also disagrees rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will disrupt extensive State and local networks' dependence on Federal policy or risks worsening public health and fiscal outcomes because few aliens are both subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility and eligible to receive means-tested public benefits like Medicaid, SNAP, and early childhood supports. However, DHS agrees that the change in the public charge inadmissibility determinations will require reevaluation for aliens, organizations providing immigration services to aliens, as well as Federal, State, and local benefit and service providers. DHS also agrees removing regulations constraining officer discretion and expanding the universe of means-tested public benefits in the totality of the circumstances may cause aliens to exercise caution when applying for or receiving Medicaid and benefits from the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), as well as food, housing, and other means-tested public benefits previously excluded from public charge inadmissibility determinations.

DHS acknowledges that immigration services providers, and Federal, State, local, and other public benefits providing agencies may have relied on information, services, and outreach to inform them of immigration consequences associated with receipt of means-tested public benefits; and DHS understands that such entities will need to update their practices and procedures consistent with this rulemaking. DHS believes that any new burden this may impose on aliens, immigration services providers, and public benefits providing agencies is outweighed by the need to conform to the statutory requirements, congressional intent, and the policy goals explained throughout this rule.

DHS is not promulgating a new, stricter standard, but rather is simply returning to decades of practice where officers will be able to consider all relevant factors, including the consideration of the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits, including the receipt of previously excluded means-tested public benefits received on or after the effective date of this final rule, as only one aspect of one factor in the totality of the circumstances. Under this approach and using governing precedent, officers have the discretion to logically determine how much such receipt should matter in the case of any specific alien. This approach is more likely to bring stability and accuracy to the administration of public charge inadmissibility.

Furthermore, DHS believes even expanding the public charge inadmissibility determination to consider previously excluded means-tested public benefits if received on or after the effective date of this final rule, as DHS is doing, would not meaningfully affect reliance interests. This is because, as DHS has noted, few aliens are both subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility and eligible to receive means-tested public benefits.[96]

DHS agrees the direct outreach conducted by the prior administration regarding excluding non-cash benefits could have strengthened certain reliance interests. As is the case with all its regulatory initiatives, DHS will notify the public via the DHS and USCIS websites and social media of changes that will result from the removal of the 2022 Final Rule, in addition to USCIS' planned subregulatory guidance to guide adjudications under this final rule. DHS intends this outreach, together with excluding consideration of non-cash public benefits received before the effective date of this final rule, will address concerns about reliance interests and assist aliens in understanding how DHS will administer section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).

DHS has a statutory responsibility to remove incentives for immigration stemming from availability of public benefits and ensure aliens seeking to remain in the United States permanently do not become dependent on the public for their support. See8 U.S.C. 1601. Therefore, DHS considered the reliance on the 2022 Final Rule, while balancing its interests in applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility to more closely reflect congressional intent and determined that when making public charge inadmissibility determinations under this final rule, DHS will not consider previously excluded means-tested public benefits if received before the effective date of this final rule.

Comment: Raising reliance interests commenters had advised clients regarding receipt of public benefits based on the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and reflected in the 2022 Final Rule that receipt of non-cash benefits would not be considered; some were concerned about the accuracy of their legal advice to clients, including ethical and malpractice implications. Commenters requested DHS either exempt non-cash benefits received before the effective date of the final rule or ensure such receipt is given little to no weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis.

Response: DHS acknowledges concerns regarding advice provided to clients based on previously effective DHS regulations and guidance and agrees that receipt of previously excluded means-tested public benefits should not be considered in the totality of the circumstances if such benefits were received before the effective date of this final rule. DHS explicitly stated this final rule will apply prospectively, and in the context of adjustment applications, DHS made conforming changes to the Form I-485 instructions to clarify which means-tested benefits should be reported and for what period. ( printed page 45347)

Comment: Several commenters said the rule is unconstitutional and suggested the rule is intended to prevent people of certain races from coming to the United States without any further explanation.

Response: DHS notes in removing the 2022 Final Rule, DHS returned to public charge inadmissibility determinations that are a faithful execution of the public charge inadmissibility statute and are consistent with national policy on immigration and welfare as set forth in PRWORA,[97] and therefore, congressional intent. DHS disagrees with the suggestion the public charge determinations DHS will make now are unconstitutional or intended to bar certain races from the United States. On the contrary, the statute does not direct DHS to consider an alien's race [98] and DHS does not, through this or any other action, target aliens of a particular race. While DHS cannot rule out the possibility of disproportionate impacts on certain racial groups, DHS is committed to applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility by considering the statutory mandatory factors, the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, and any other specific fact or circumstance the officer determines is relevant to assessing the individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge.

Comment: Multiple commenters stated the proposed rule violates the Fifth Amendment's due process clause because it fails to provide fair notice of the standards with which individuals must comply and invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement due to the lack of standards governing the exercise of discretion thereby depriving applicants of procedural due process. Commenters also raised concerns that this rule violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees by targeting individuals for discriminatory treatment based on their race, ethnicity, and/or national origin, gender or disability, and indicated that nonwhite immigrants will be disproportionately harmed by it because it will not be applied equally and is likely to be applied on the basis of protected characteristics.

Response: DHS strongly disagrees that officers will make public charge inadmissibility determinations in a manner that violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As a preliminary matter in the NPRM and this final rule, DHS provided the regulated public with sufficient notice that officers will apply the statute, binding precedent decisions, and subregulatory guidance which USCIS will publish in advance of the effective date of this final rule when making public charge inadmissibility determinations. DHS identified the factors, including the receipt of any means-tested public benefit, to be considered in public charge determinations in both the NPRM and this final rule, and also explained that while it was removing regulatory text, exceptions from the public charge ground of inadmissibility are statutory. These factors will also remain on the USCIS website and in the Form I-485 instructions for ease of reference. As a result, the public will be on notice regarding what officers will consider when making public charge inadmissibility determinations, and thus the public will have fair notice of the standards officers will use when making admissibility determinations. Section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), is clear that it applies to aliens seeking admission, visa, or adjustment of status, and establishes the minimum factors DHS is required to consider, and precedent decisions discussed in the NPRM and this final rule provide examples and establish certain parameters regarding the application of this ground of inadmissibility. Future USCIS guidance will provide further insight regarding relevant considerations.

In particular, and as discussed elsewhere in this final rule, USCIS revised the Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, and its instructions to clarify aliens must provide information relevant to the factors considered in public charge inadmissibility determination. For instance, instructions include questions about family status,[99] receipt of any means-tested public benefits, including the dates and amount of receipt, and an explanation as to why those benefits were received,[100] and any education and skills they have. Additionally, aliens required to undergo an immigration medical examination must submit a Form I-693, Report of Immigration Medical Examination, which USCIS considers as part of the mandatory health factor, in the totality of the circumstances. Insofar as this rule makes clear officers consider any other factors relevant to determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge, aliens may submit any other evidence they believe relevant to this determination. While not specific to public charge inadmissibility determinations, USCIS notifies applicants of deficiencies in their applications with respect to any ineligibility in accordance with 8 CFR 103.2 and USCIS policy on RFEs, NOIDs, and denials.[101]

Similarly, DHS disagrees its public charge inadmissibility determinations will discriminate against aliens from certain races, ethnicities, or countries. DHS must consider, at a minimum, an applicant's age, health, family status, assets, resources and financial status, and education and skills. DHS officers will also consider the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits and any other factors they determine are relevant to determining whether any individual alien is likely at any time to become a public charge, as Congress intended. INA secs. 212(a)(4)(B) and (s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B) and (s).

While aliens present in the United States are protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,[102] which requires that immigration proceedings be conducted fairly and without discrimination or bias,[103] DHS' public charge determinations are neither facially discriminatory nor intended to have a discriminatory effect based on race, ethnicity, national origin, or any other protected classifications. The Supreme Court determined that immigration decisions made by DHS, specifically pertaining to which aliens are permitted to enter or remain in the United States, are subjected to a “narrow standard of review. . . .” [104] ( printed page 45348) Any due process or equal protection claim regarding this rulemaking would be subject to rational basis scrutiny.[105 106] Generally, laws, regulations, and policies that neither involve fundamental rights nor include suspect classifications are reviewed under rational basis scrutiny, under which the person challenging the law must show the government has no legitimate interest in the law or policy or there is no rational link between the interest and the challenged law or regulation.[107] DHS believes that this rulemaking would survive rational basis scrutiny because it is rationally related to DHS's statutory authority: to determine which aliens seeking admission and adjustment of status are inadmissible under section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), that aliens present in the United States are self-sufficient and do not rely on public resources, and to minimize incentives for aliens to immigrate to the United States due to public benefits, 8 U.S.C. 1601.[108]

Further, the public charge inadmissibility determinations DHS will make under this final rule, clearly reflect a rational link to the government's interest in ensuring that aliens in the United States are self-sufficient and do not rely on the public assistance to meet their needs. While this rule does not limit officer discretion, it contemplates that officers will exercise that discretion rationally and fairly, and in addition to the mandatory statutory factors, will consider only facts and circumstances that are relevant to any public charge inadmissibility determination. So, while it is possible that these determinations may in some instances result in more aliens from a protected classification ( e.g., a racial or ethnic group, specific sex, etc.) being found inadmissible under the public charge ground, that does not mean that this rule or individual public charge inadmissibility determinations made after the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, neither this rule nor the individual inadmissibility determinations officers will make under the public charge ground of inadmissibility are facially discriminatory or have a discriminatory purpose.[109]

Comment: A commenter stated the proposed rule conflicts with the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments and undermines federalism by potentially penalizing State public benefit programs because: the Supreme Court recognized federalism prohibits Congress and the Executive from intruding on State sovereignty and powers reserved to the States, even if otherwise authorized under an enumerated power which stems from federal constitutional structure in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments prohibiting the Federal government from commandeering a State to implement Federal commands.

Response: DHS public charge inadmissibility determinations under this rulemaking neither implicate the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments nor have federalism implications. First, it is not clear from the comment how this rule could even theoretically implicate the Eleventh Amendment [110] which pertains to judicial powers and not the power of the Executive Branch. Second, pertaining to the Tenth Amendment reservation clause,[111] nothing in this rule purports to take away power that was Constitutionally reserved for the States. While the NPRM and this final rule acknowledge some indirect impacts on States, the rule does not regulate State, local, or Tribal functions. This rule simply exercises the Secretary's lawfully delegated authority over immigration [112] and the public charge inadmissibility. INA secs. 103(a) and 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a) and 1182(a)(4). The commenter did not cite caselaw or explain how this final rule can be viewed to commandeer States and DHS strongly disagrees with that sentiment. Furthermore, this rule does not violate Federalism principles because it does not substantially impact States, the relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Although this rulemaking will expand the universe of means-tested public benefits that DHS will consider in public charge inadmissibility determinations, to include benefits that may be fully or partially funded or administered by State, local, or Tribal governments, DHS is neither regulating which aliens may receive such benefits nor how States, local, and Tribal governments administer such programs. Consequently, DHS does not expect that this final rule will impose substantial direct compliance costs on State, local, or Tribal governments, or preempt State law.

Comment: A commenter wrote rescission is unconstitutional under the “void for vagueness doctrine” and unlawful pursuant to section 706(2)(c) of the APA, reasoning the rescission fails to provide, and deliberately obscures, any fair notice to those potentially affected, of the conduct encompassed by the public charge ground of inadmissibility resulting in a ( printed page 45349) total lack of standards for assessing inadmissibility under public charge and virtually guarantees arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by immigration officers, citing Sessions v. Dimaya.[113]

Response: DHS disagrees that either the proposed rule or this final rule is vague. As discussed earlier in this preamble, DHS believes its approach in this rule falls within the explicit discretionary authority Congress delegated to the Secretary regarding public charge inadmissibility determinations. Thus, DHS's rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, and subsequent administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility as outlined in this final rule are consistent with the statute and applicable precedent is well within the Secretary's authority. It is also consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in PRWORA. See8 U.S.C. 1601. DHS notes it is Congress that established the public charge ground of inadmissibility and, in delegating discretion to DHS, identified a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered when making public charge determinations. Congress did not prescribe how this discretion should be exercised, i.e., how these factors should be applied, precluded consideration of other factors, nor provided a prescriptive roadmap for agencies to follow when making public charge inadmissibility determinations. Congress left to INS and DHS, how to interpret and apply those factors, including how to incorporate a consideration of public benefit receipt the public charge inadmissibility determinations. Prior to the issuance of the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and promulgation of agency regulations in 2019 and 2022, the public charge ground of inadmissibility was successfully applied in adjudications and certain precedential decisions developed from that discretionary application. By rescinding the 2022 Final Rule, DHS is returning to the pre-1999 application of officer discretion consistent with the statute and applicable precedent. Furthermore, the NPRM and this final rule have been explicit about considering all information and evidence relevant to assessing whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge will be considered in the totality of the circumstances.

While DHS generally agrees that the constitutional vagueness doctrine applies to regulations (in addition to statutes), particularly those regulating criminal conduct or imposing penalties, DHS disagrees that the vagueness doctrine applies to the rescission of an agency regulation because no replacement regulation was proposed in the NPRM or adopted by this final rule. In addition, to the extent the vagueness doctrine would apply to future subregulatory guidance, DHS does not intend that guidance to be vague.

Even if removal of the 2022 Final Rule is subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine, DHS believes Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018), is distinguishable because that case dealt with the Federal criminal code's incorporation of the definition of “crime of violence” into the INA, and application of the same in the removal context, rather than a civil statute that specifically authorizes broad discretion in subjective determinations and prohibits no conduct.[114]

Comment: Citing the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Plyler v. Doe,[115] some commenters said this rule violates the principles set forth in Plyler because it discriminates against children by making predictions and assumptions about receipt of public benefits based on their parents' decisions and using a child's lawful access to food or medical care as evidence against a parent applying for admission or adjustment of status which inverts that principle entirely risking equal protection guarantees meant to shield children.

Response: DHS disagrees that removal of the 2022 Final Rule is inconsistent with Plyler v. Doe. In Plyler, the Supreme Court held States cannot discriminate against children on the basis of undocumented status. As courts have recognized, Plyler relates to distinctions made by States rather than the Federal government and therefore does not apply to DHS or this rulemaking.[116] Even if Plyler applies to the Federal government on the theory that the equal protection protections applicable to States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are extended to the Federal Government by virtue of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,[117] DHS believes that Plyler would still be distinguishable. First, the Supreme Court recognized that Federal alienage classifications are subject to rational-basis review because immigration regulation is entrusted to the political branches.[118] Therefore, the standard of review would be different than in Plyer.[119] Secondly, unlike in Plyler, where State action categorically deprived children of education based on their immigration status, in this case DHS is not depriving alien children of any right. The rescission of the 2022 Final Rule does not categorically exclude anyone from any government benefit program; it merely returns public charge inadmissibility determinations to the historical practice of applying the statute and relevant precedent, in which receipt of means-tested public benefits is but one consideration in the totality of the circumstances. While this rule may disincentivize some parents from applying for means-tested public benefits on their children's behalf, it does so consistent with our national policy that such benefits not provide an incentive for immigration. See8 U.S.C. 1601. Furthermore, the rule in no way prevents alien children from receiving means-tested public benefits for which they are eligible and under this rule, the receipt of such benefits alone, including where parents applied on their behalf, is not outcome determinative in a public charge inadmissibility determination. Therefore, DHS strongly disagrees that this final rule violates the principles of Plyler.

Furthermore, this final rule does not render children per se inadmissible under the public charge ground due to the receipt of means-tested public benefits that their parents applied for on their behalf. As is the case with any alien seeking admission or adjustment ( printed page 45350) of status, as required by the statute, DHS considers that child's age, health, family status, assets and resources, financial status, education, and skills, along with receipt of means-tested public benefits in the totality of the circumstances. Under this final rule, DHS can also consider, for instance, the length, recency, and amount of receipt of those benefits, the fact that the child's parent sought the benefits on the child's behalf, and that the child is not likely to receive such benefits once they reach the age of maturity.

With respect to the suggestion DHS is impermissibly considering the receipt of means-tested public benefits by an alien's child, DHS notes as reflected in the changes to the adjustment of status application, USCIS is only collecting information about the receipt of any means-tested public benefits by the alien applying for adjustment.[120] DHS further notes the receipt of means-tested public benefits by an alien's children would only be relevant to the alien's public charge determination to the extent either the means-tested public benefits received by the alien's child are the alien's source of financial support or the alien is legally obligated to support the child who is receiving the means-tested public benefits. In both cases, receipt of means-tested public benefits by the alien's child would be relevant to the alien's assets, resources, and financial status and would be considered in the totality of the circumstances.

DHS has discussed in other comment responses how this rule does not violate the equal protection clause and incorporates those responses here. However, even if the rule did place additional restrictions on aliens, the Supreme Court, even prior to PRWORA, determined the equal protection analysis of Federal action that differentiates between citizens and aliens in the immigration context is different from the equal protection analysis of State actions that differentiate between citizens of another State and citizens of another country.[121]

Comment: One commenter stated the proposed rule undermines U.S. human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1977,[122] including the right to adequate housing and obligation to implement it without discrimination.

Response: DHS rejects the assertion this rule violates the United States' treaty obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. DHS notes the United States has not ratified this covenant and therefore has no associated treaty obligations. Separately, DHS notes its public charge determinations under this final rule are not inconsistent with this treaty, which “recognize[s] the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.” [123] Simply put, in making public charge inadmissibility determinations under this final rule, DHS officers will consider the statutory minimum factors, receipt of any means-tested public benefits, and any other factor an officer, in his or her discretion, determines is relevant to assessing the alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. Consideration of these factors does not prevent any alien subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility from applying for and receiving any means-tested public benefits for which they are eligible, including benefits related to food, clothing, or housing. As was the case prior to the 1999 Interim Field Guidance, DHS will now consider any receipt of means-tested public benefits in the totality of the circumstances, as such receipt bears on an alien's self-sufficiency and likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge but receipt of means-tested public benefits alone is not outcome determinative.[124]

Comment: Many commenters expressed concerns the new rule would apply retroactively to aliens who received means-tested public benefits previously excluded from consideration, as grounds to deny permanent residence, unfairly penalizing decisions made in good faith under existing guidance. One commenter, citing caselaw, stated unless expressly authorized by Congress, a rule may not take away vested rights under existing laws, or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability with respect to concluded transactions or considerations and DHS impermissibly relied on INA sec. 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), to consider past use of previously excluded public benefits, concluding the NPRM was impermissibly retroactive. Other commenters wrote in contrast to the 2019 and 2022 rules, the proposed rule does not clearly state it only applies prospectively and to honor these reliance interests and uphold basic principles of administrative law, DHS must explicitly state any policy changes will apply only prospectively, ensuring families are not retroactively penalized for accessing the healthcare and nutrition benefits essential to their health under protections relied upon in the 2022 Final Rule. Another similarly remarked retroactively implementing more stringent rules would undermine the Federal Government's credibility and people's ability to rely on its policies. Another requested a transition policy preventing retroactive penalization for benefit use during the period in which the 2022 Final Rule was in effect and explaining how reliance interests will be weighed for pending/near-term filings. Other commenters requested a clause in the final rule stating receipt of benefits that were excluded prior to the rule's publication will not be considered or would be considered consistently with the 2022 Final Rule. Several of these commenters noted that such a clear statement was included in both the 2018 ( printed page 45351) NPRM and the 2019 Final Rule, and its omission from this proposal was deeply alarming. In addition to a non-retroactivity clause, one commenter asked DHS to clarify that aliens do not need to report benefits received prior to the final rule's effective date and that the use of State-funded programs based on reliance of prior DHS policies would be excluded. Another urged DHS not to treat past use of the Oregon Health Plan (OHP) or similar Medicaid coverage, obtained while the 2022 Final Rule is in effect, as a negative factor in any public charge determination stating families should not be retroactively harmed for relying on clear government messaging.

Response: DHS did not claim an express grant of retroactive rulemaking authority nor specifically relied on INA sec. 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), for that authority. DHS also did not propose to find aliens inadmissible under the public charge ground and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status based on the past receipt of public benefits previously excluded from consideration under the 2022 Final Rule. In general, DHS applies its regulations prospectively. DHS agrees the U.S. Supreme Court held “statutory grants of rulemaking authority will not be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by express terms” [125] and retroactive rules alter the past legal consequences of past actions.[126] DHS also recognizes a rule operates retroactively if it takes away or impairs vested rights.[127] In addition, DHS recognizes if a new rule is “substantively inconsistent” with a prior agency practice and attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment, it operates retroactively.[128] However, an agency rule altering future effect, not the past legal consequences of an action, or that upsets expectations based on prior law (which may be characterized as secondary retroactivity), is not necessarily impermissibly retroactive. Finally, “[a] rule that has unreasonable secondary retroactivity—for example, altering future regulation in a manner that makes worthless substantial past investment incurred in reliance upon the prior rule—may for that reason be `arbitrary' or `capricious.' ” [129] This final rule makes clear that it is not altering the past consequences of past actions or imposing new adverse consequences for past actions taken in reliance on prior agency regulations, and therefore would not be impermissibly retroactive or arbitrary and capricious for having an unjustified secondary retroactive effect.

While DHS does not agree the NPRM was impermissibly retroactive, DHS recognizes some aliens may have relied on the 2022 Final Rule, including the outreach, when making decisions on previously excluded means-tested public benefits. Therefore, DHS will not consider the receipt of previously excluded means-tested public benefits if such benefits were received before the effective date of this final rule. However, if the alien continues to receive these benefits on or after the effective date of this final rule, DHS will consider that receipt in the totality of the circumstances.

DHS also agrees it is helpful to state explicitly in this final rule how the rule will be implemented. DHS included an Implementation section in this preamble that clarified that this final rule will apply to applications for admission made on or after the effective date of this final rule and applications for adjustment of status postmarked or electronically submitted on or after that date and accepted by USCIS pursuant to 8 CFR 103.2(a)(1) and (a)(2).[130] To determine whether a case was postmarked before the effective date of the rule, DHS will consider the postmark date for the application or petition currently before USCIS, not the postmark date for any previously-filed application or petition USCIS rejected pursuant to 8 CFR 103.2(a)(7)(ii). Similarly, DHS clarified it will consider the receipt of means-tested public benefits received before the effective date of this final rule consistently with the 2022 Final Rule, i.e., DHS will only consider the alien's receipt of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), State, Tribal, territorial, and local public cash assistance for income maintenance and long-term institutionalization at government expense received. DHS also clarified in the Form I-485 instructions that with respect to means-tested public benefits that were received before the effective date of this final rule, DHS will only collect information about the receipt of SSI, TANF, State, Tribal, territorial, and local public cash assistance for income maintenance, and long-term institutionalization at government expense. With respect to the OHP or Medicaid received before the effective date of this final rule, DHS will treat such receipt consistently with the 2022 Final Rule and only consider receipt in the context of long-term institutionalization at government expense limited to institutional services under section 1905(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396d(a), when received by a beneficiary, including in a nursing facility or mental health institution.

As discussed in other comment responses, this rule does not direct or require aliens to disenroll from means-tested public benefits. However, when making a public charge inadmissibility determination under this final rule, where there is evidence in the record of any past receipt of means-tested public benefits, USCIS may request the alien clarify whether he or she is continuing to receive means-tested public benefits, or has disenrolled. USCIS will consider any evidence the alien provides demonstrating that he or she has disenrolled.

Comment: A commenter stated the resistance to retroactive penalization is a matter of basic civil liberties, not just administrative law, and retroactive application of the new public charge rule runs afoul of 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(G), which the proposed rule cites as a source of DHS's legal authority.

Response: DHS disagrees it violated 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(G) regarding the civil rights and civil liberties of persons or economic security of the United States because, as explained in the immediately preceding comment response, this final rule does not operate retroactively and DHS included clarifications to ensure there is no confusion among the regulated public or officers administering public charge. DHS explained in other comment responses this final rule does not discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, or any other protected class, nor otherwise violate aliens' civil rights or civil liberties, and that DHS is well within its authority to consider all factors mandated by Congress. Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 111(b), this rule promotes the economic security of the United States by ensuring aliens who lack self-sufficiency are not ( printed page 45352) admitted or granted adjustment of status.

Comment: Numerous commenters opposed the proposed rule due to concerns about officer discretion in the absence of clear guidelines for making public charge determinations, and lack of any discernible framework, raising concerns about “excessive,” “broad,” “unbounded,” “unchecked,” or “too much” discretion. Others expressed concern it would lead to unfair, arbitrary, inconsistent, erroneous, and possibly discriminatory outcomes. Other commenters agreed and wrote that the NPRM failed to consider how “unfettered” discretion will result in inconsistent decisions reflecting adjudicator-level variability including different treatment among field offices, officers, or adjudicatory culture leading to inconsistency and reduced trust in the immigration system. Several commenters remarked while the INA assigns the public charge assessment to the “opinion of the Attorney General,” the degree to which the NPRM centers adjudicative discretion is an inaccurate reading of the statute, suggesting the lack of guidance would create a system “in which applicants face radically different outcomes depending on who reviews their case.” A form letter campaign expressed concern that the expanded criteria would give officers independent discretion, allowing them to make high-stakes immigration decisions based on broad, loosely defined factors. Others wrote that the proposed rule fails to identify why this kind of broad authority for officers is necessary.

Response: DHS disagrees with the premise of these comments. DHS is restoring the decades-old practice of broad officer discretion, which ensures that aliens who, in the opinion of a DHS officer, are likely at any time to become a public charge are refused admission or denied adjustment of status. Similarly, DHS disagrees with the commenter's suggestion that all standards for public charge inadmissibility determinations have been removed with the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. 87 FR 55472 (Sept. 9, 2022). Section 212(a)(4)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A), states “any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the [immigration officer] at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.” Section 212(a)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B), lists the minimum, non-exhaustive factors the consular officer or immigration officer must consider when making a public charge determination: the alien's age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills. In addition to those five factors, the consular officer or immigration officer may also consider any Form I-864 when making a public charge inadmissibility determination.

Trusting in the judgment of officers to make reasonable adjudicative decisions consistent with the statute and binding precedent will not lead to arbitrary, inconsistent, discriminatory, or erroneous outcomes. With respect to commenters' related concern about the potential for variability among discretionary decisions, DHS notes the statute explicitly accounts for variability by using the language “in the opinion of” and “at a minimum.” USCIS will issue policy and interpretive tools applicable to USCIS' adjustment of status adjudications, which will guide officers in making public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with the law and based on a consideration of all relevant evidence and information. Such subregulatory guidance will be published in advance of or on the effective date of this final rule, will not be a legislative rule, will comply with the APA, and have a reasonable basis generally informed by the comments on this NPRM.

Adjudicative discretion is built into most aspects of the U.S. immigration system. Congress, in passing the INA and other immigration statutes and amending them over the years, explicitly stated in statutory text that many immigration benefits are discretionary.[131] Very few types of immigration benefit requests are not discretionary, though notable examples include applications for naturalization and most types of immigrant visa petitions. Congress has also frequently included language stating that determinations made in connection with immigration benefit requests or enforcement activity are discretionary. Section 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), is replete with examples of such explicit language regarding the discretionary nature of certain inadmissibility determinations, for example when assessing involvement in controlled substance trafficking; [132] aiding, abetting, assisting, or conspiring, or colluding with someone involved in human trafficking; [133] money laundering; [134] or seeking to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in espionage, evasion of export control laws, unlawful activity, or activities intended to oppose, control, or overthrow our government by force, violence, or other unlawful means; [135] officers make the determination if they know or have reason to believe the alien has engaged in such conduct. The same “knows, or has reasonable ground to believe” discretionary standard appears in relation to determining whether aliens engaging in or likely to engage in terrorist activity after entry are inadmissible.[136] Other broad discretionary language, “has reasonable ground to believe,” is used to assess whether an alien is inadmissible because his or her entry or proposed activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences.[137] Additionally, an exception to one of the terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds is available when “the consular officer or Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe” an alien has renounced a family member's terrorist activity. INA sec. 212(a)(3)(B)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)(II).

The discretionary “in the opinion of” language used in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), is not unusual within immigration laws granting broad discretion to the Executive Branch. Congress established that “[a]ny alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible” (emphasis added). Congress went on to state in making such a determination, “the ( printed page 45353) consular officer or the Attorney General shall at a minimum consider” (emphasis added) five statutory factors, and “ may also consider any affidavit of support” (emphasis added) under section 213A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183a. Congress's use of “in the opinion of” in the public charge statute is arguably the broadest discretionary language used in connection with an inadmissibility determination under section 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a). While Congress required officers to consider five specific factors, it described these as “minimum” factors to be considered. This language shows Congress clearly intended officers to consider case-specific additional factors and information relevant to the public charge inadmissibility determination.

While broad, the discretion granted by Congress to officers making public charge inadmissibility determinations is not “excessive, unbounded, or unchecked” as stated by various commenters. Officers make public charge inadmissibility determinations within the statutory framework, considering at a minimum the five factors required by Congress, and, consistent with binding precedent, any other factor relevant to assessing an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, including the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits. As noted previously, DHS and legacy INS officers successfully and reasonably applied public charge long before DHS codified the public charge ground of inadmissibility in regulation with no trouble applying statute, precedent, and agency guidance.[138] With this final rule, DHS restores officers' ability to appropriately consider all pertinent facts and circumstances relevant to an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, rather than forcing them to ignore relevant evidence and information falling outside the narrow parameters of the current regulation. This is consistent with the implicit trust Congress placed in officers' judgment and discretion in this area of law.

Comment: Another commenter wrote the proposed rule would turn the public charge inadmissibility determination from one governed by “ex-ante” determinations, i.e. predictive and forward-looking, to one driven by “ex-post” determinations, which focus on events that have already occurred.

Response: DHS disagrees that the public charge inadmissibility determinations under the final rule would be driven by “ex-post” determinations. Under the statute, this final rule, and any subsequent subregulatory guidance, public charge inadmissibility determinations will remain forward-looking, prospective determinations based on the totality of the circumstances, just as Congress intended. In making a forward-looking determination, officers must rely on the information available to them at the time of the adjudication. Such information will necessarily reflect both current and past events and circumstances. However, such information is only relevant to the extent it provides a basis for the officer's forward-looking determination that, in the officer's opinion, the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. Having received means-tested public benefits in the past is not outcome-determinative but merely informs the prospective determination in the totality of the circumstances.[139]

Comment: Commenters suggested that the proposed rule would disadvantage officers as they would apply their discretion with a lack of any discernible framework, falling short of the stated goal of creating a precise and accurate process. A commenter wrote that DHS officers are accustomed to adjudicating applications under the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and similar 2022 Final Rule, and that eliminating key elements of that guidance and rule without establishing a detailed framework in their place would result in inconsistency and confusion in the application of the public charge ground of inadmissibility. Another commenter noted that removal of the clear list of factors would, in practice, result in officers, who are not licensed physicians, actuaries, or financial professionals, evaluating complex medical records and prognoses; interpreting insurance and public benefits eligibility rules under Federal and state law; analyzing tax transcripts, assets, liabilities, and income projections to make a predictive determination. The commenter stated the NPRM neither describes a corresponding requirement that such officers hold any professional licensure or specialized training in medicine, accounting, finance, or actuarial science, nor established an external review mechanism to correct technical errors.

Response: Our immigration laws are replete with examples of Congress placing explicit trust in officers' opinion and judgment without requiring DHS or DOJ to implement regulations on those topics. DHS has generally not published regulations guiding officers' implementation of the grounds of inadmissibility.[140] The establishment of detailed regulations regarding public charge inadmissibility determinations in 2019 and 2022 makes this inadmissibility ground an outlier. DHS notes that there are no regulations at all relating to the deportation grounds of section 237(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1227. A lack of regulations in this or any other area of immigration law will not disadvantage officers or result in less accurate decisions.

DHS disagrees with commenters that officers need expertise in various fields beyond normal adjudication training DHS provides any time it changes or modifies agency policy. DHS and legacy INS officers successfully and reasonably applied the public charge ground of inadmissibility long before DHS codified the public charge ground of inadmissibility in regulation based on the statute, precedent, and agency guidance. DHS is confident that officers will be able to continue performing these functions with competence and integrity and exercise their best judgment when considering the statutory mandatory factors, the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, and all other evidence relevant to assessing the individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge.

As for officers being familiar with the framework established by the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and generally included in the 2022 Final Rule, and unfamiliar with applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility after the removal of most of the 2022 Final Rule from 8 CFR part 212, this is not unusual. Whenever the agency amends its regulations or policies, or Congress amends a statute, officers must familiarize themselves with adjudicating consistent with the new context. USCIS will provide guidance and training to officers to aid them in ( printed page 45354) the transition, as it generally does in such situations.

Comment: Multiple commenters warned a lack of guidance would create a void resulting in confusion and uncertainty. Conversely, another wrote the prior public charge framework is proven, easier to apply, and avoids unpredictable outcomes, maintaining fairness, transparency, and predictability in immigration decisions. A commenter remarked that existing guidance allowed their organization to provide clients with clear information on what types of programs are safe to access. Another stated the effects of the proposed rule cannot be ascertained, creating difficulty for governments and organizations to advise people who seek assistance.

Response: DHS disagrees with commenters' suggestions that this final rule creates a void or results in confusion or uncertainty, or that the 2022 Final Rule is “proven” (in the sense that it results in outcomes consistent with congressional intent). DHS believes the statute and the relevant precedent decisions that guided public charge determinations for decades, as well as recent circuit case law, provide these organizations with sufficient guidance to advise aliens concerning this ground of inadmissibility. DHS has explained how this final rule is more consistent with congressional intent and noted that the rule ensures officers are able to use good judgment and discretion to make highly individualized, fact-specific, case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions based on the totality of each alien's circumstances, rather than being limited by rigid regulatory definitions and standards. 90 FR 52168, 52194 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also explained that prior regulatory approaches may have resulted in DHS finding aliens eligible for adjustment of status or admission even when their past receipt of means-tested public benefits would have demonstrated that they were likely at any time to become a public charge, due to officers' inability to consider all benefits relevant to the case-specific factors and information bearing on the inadmissibility determination. 90 FR 52168, 52180 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS again notes, with one limited exception relating to elements of section 212(a)(7) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7), there are no regulations relating to the application of other grounds of inadmissibility that governments, service providers, attorneys, or community organizations can reference when providing advice to aliens. It is the current rigid and restrictive public charge regulations which are the outlier in this area of law. As described in other comment responses, USCIS will formulate and publish appropriate policy and interpretive tools that will go into effect on the effective date of this Final Rule to guide officers, and inform the public, about public charge inadmissibility determinations.

Comment: A commenter stated immigration officers do not make sound public charge inadmissibility determinations, citing research that demonstrated between 2015 and 2024, approximately 70.5 percent of public charge inadmissibility determinations were later dismissed.

Response: The commenter referenced an analysis conducted by researchers at George Washington University, based on a table in the Annual Reports of the Visa Office (of DOS, Bureau of Consular Affairs) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015-2024.[141] However, the researchers fundamentally misunderstood DOS processes and how to interpret the data. Even if they understood how to properly interpret the data, DOS consular officers make visa refusal decisions under different regulations and policies than USCIS officers, with significantly different levels of administrative review.

DHS notes an alien can apply for adjustment of status with USCIS, submit all the required initial evidence, and appear for an interview, without establishing eligibility for the benefit. After reviewing the information provided on the application or in the interview, the officer may determine whether he or she needs additional information or evidence. In such situations, USCIS may issue a NOID or RFE. This provides the alien with the opportunity to address USCIS' determination they failed to meet their burden of proof in demonstrating eligibility. The adjustment of status application remains pending and USCIS completes the adjudication based on the response received, if any.

DOS lacks a similar procedural mechanism. If a consular officer finds an alien failed to demonstrate he or she is admissible to the United States as an immigrant under section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), because of a missing piece of evidence or some conflicting information that needs to be resolved, the consular officer cannot leave the immigrant visa application pending and issue the alien a NOID or RFE. Instead, the consular officer refuses the visa which is equivalent to a denial by USCIS. The alien may attempt to overcome the reason for the refusal by providing DOS with additional information or arguments. DOS may choose to find the alien overcame the reason for the refusal and issue the visa.

It is a critical misunderstanding of DOS procedures to interpret a visa refusal listed in that table of the Annual Report of the Visa Office as a definitive finding that the alien was inadmissible under the specified ground of inadmissibility, and an even greater error to interpret an “ineligibility overcome” as evidence of some definitive finding of inadmissibility that was later dismissed. The equivalent at USCIS would be, as noted, the issuance of an RFE or NOID followed by a satisfactory response and an approval of the adjustment of status application. There is a significant difference between what these data show (generally, an alien failed to fully meet his or her burden—something was missing or needed to be further explained) and what the researchers claim (consular officers, with all applicable information and evidence in front of them and no paperwork errors on the part of the alien, made a finding of inadmissibility).

These were not inadmissibility findings that were “dismissed.” These were, generally, situations in which the initial evidence and information provided by the alien was insufficient. After being notified of the deficiency, the alien provided what was previously lacking and DOS issued the visa. DHS directs the commenters' attention to visa refusals under the health-related grounds of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(1). In FY 2024, there were 191 refusals for a communicable disease of public health significance, and 228 initial refusals were overcome. It would be equally inaccurate for the commenters to suggest there was a 119 percent “dismissal” rate because of erroneous initial determinations by consular officers under this provision.[142] The figures should instead be interpreted as indicating that aliens who were refused visas because they were sick at the time of the initial medical screening either were re-screened and cleared or received treatment. Just because an alien eventually overcomes the basis for the refusal of the visa due to changed circumstances, the provision of ( printed page 45355) additional evidence, or a persuasive legal argument does not mean that the initial decision of the consular officer was in error or was “dismissed.”

Finally, during the time period covered by the DOS data included in the commenter's analysis, USCIS issued tens of thousands of RFEs and NOIDs relating to section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Almost all of them related to deficiencies with Form I-864. If the alien provided a response to the RFE or NOID demonstrating he or she had a Form I-864 meeting the requirements of section 213A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, and the application was otherwise approvable (including that a favorable exercise of discretion was warranted, if applicable), USCIS then approved the application. Otherwise, USCIS denied the adjustment application. It did so, and continues to do so, without engaging in any of the analysis under discussion related to this rule, as failure to provide a sufficient Form I-864, if one is required, is grounds for automatic denial without determining whether an alien “is likely at any time to become a public charge” based on the minimum factors and the totality of the circumstances. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(C), (D) and 213A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C), (D) and 1183a(a)(1).

Comment: A commenter wrote past experiences with immigration enforcement by local law enforcement officers in Arizona demonstrated allowing too much discretion to officials can be harmful. Some commenters noted expanding officer discretion will disproportionately hurt vulnerable groups, especially Cuban and Haitian parolees who used public benefits legally and exactly as the government instructed.

Response: Regarding concerns relating to past abuses of discretion by local police in Arizona who engaged in racial profiling in traffic stops for immigration enforcement, the relevance to this rulemaking or public charge inadmissibility determinations is unclear. DHS officers make public charge inadmissibility determinations when an alien affirmatively applies for admission or adjustment of status. This inadmissibility ground applies to all aliens applying for admission as immigrants and applying for adjustment of status, regardless of their race or country of origin, and DHS does not have authority to ignore the ground when applicable. Moreover, DHS does not target certain populations on the basis of race when applying any ground of inadmissibility.

DHS notes many Cubans and Haitians present in the United States who have received means-tested public benefits would be exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility when applying for certain immigration benefits, minimizing any impact from the consideration of any receipt of means-tested public benefits. For example, eligible aliens applying for adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act, under section 902 of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, and under section 202 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) are exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility.[143]

Comment: A commenter stated the proposal would turn decisions into subjective judgments based on an undefined “totality of the circumstances” while another wrote that the proposed reliance on past precedent and the “totality of the circumstances” approach could introduce a degree of subjectivity leading to inconsistent determinations, further stating that clarity and consistent application of these principles is crucial to ensure fairness and predictability. Another wrote the proposed rule relies on a “totality of the circumstances” test without identifying how immigration officers will weigh household benefit use and guardrails to prevent treating household benefit use as presumptively indicative of future dependence.

Response: Public charge inadmissibility determinations are necessarily subjective because they are prospective and based on the opinion of the officer. As discussed elsewhere in this preamble, DHS is committed to ensuring officers have the necessary resources to timely and efficiently adjudicate applications for immigration benefits. USCIS will provide guidance and training to officers in the transition, as it generally does in such situations, ameliorating commenters' concerns. Furthermore, to ensure consistency and quality control, USCIS will monitor adjudications and apply its general quality control processes. USCIS will continually assess and improve the adjudication processes, procedures, and training as needed to ensure consistency.

While commenters may object to the totality of the circumstances, this approach to public charge inadmissibility has been recognized as the proper framework for many decades. DHS suggests that commenters review those portions of the NPRM relating to the history of this framework in public charge determinations. 90 FR 52168, 52174-52175 (Nov. 19, 2025). Regarding receipt of benefits by members of the alien's household, the public charge inadmissibility determination focuses on the facts and circumstances bearing on the likelihood at any time that the alien applying for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status will become a public charge, not the likelihood of his or her family members becoming a public charge. As explained in other comment responses, the receipt of means-tested public benefits by members of the alien's household would only be relevant to the public charge inadmissibility determination to the extent either those benefits are the alien's source of financial support or the household member who is receiving the means-tested public benefits is someone the alien is legally obligated to support. DHS would consider that fact as part of the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances.[144]

Comment: A commenter expressed concern with the discretion provided to immigration officers under the proposed rule, writing that under the 2022 Final Rule officers only considered whether an alien is likely to become primarily dependent on cash-assistance or long-term institutionalization, an approach previously enshrined by INS in the 1999 Interim Field Guidance to simplify the public charge inadmissibility determination. Another commenter stated INS initially developed the 1999 Interim Field Guidance due to widespread concern over confusion surrounding how use of benefits impacted public charge determinations as well as the associated public health consequences.

Response: DHS disagrees with the premise of these comments. Requiring officers be willfully blind to the past, current, or likely future receipt of all other types of means-tested public benefits may be “simple” but inconsistent with both section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and Congress's statement of national policy concerning public benefits and immigration in 8 U.S.C. 1601(2). While certain categories of aliens may be ( printed page 45356) eligible for some public benefits, Congress established immigration consequences for aliens choosing to receive those benefits in sections 212(a)(4) and 237(a)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4) and 1227(a)(5). Congress explicitly enumerated the instances where certain aliens receiving public benefits do not have that receipt considered as part of the public charge inadmissibility determination. See INA sec. 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(s).

Comment: Another commenter said while they appreciated allowing officers greater discretion in evaluating inadmissibility, they were concerned that removing the existing framework could lead to a less consistent and potentially more restrictive application of the law, inadvertently creating new barriers for deserving individuals. The commenter urged DHS to consider the long-term implications of the proposed change and prioritize clarity, fairness, and a nuanced understanding of individual circumstances in future policies and interpretive tools.

Response: DHS agrees it is critical public charge inadmissibility determinations reflect a nuanced understanding of an alien's individual circumstances i.e., a consideration of all relevant information and evidence in the totality of the circumstances. Faithful implementation of the public charge ground of inadmissibility requires allowing officers to consider all such relevant information and evidence. This may increase the information collection burden for adjustment applicants and may result in more aliens properly being found inadmissible in accordance with the statute. However, it is Congress who established the statutes governing who is, and is not, eligible to receive the important benefit of status as an LPR, and DHS's responsibility, with other agencies that administer this ground, to identify those aliens who fail to meet the criteria. Additionally, DHS notes that USCIS will issue policy and interpretive tools applicable to USCIS' adjustment of status adjudications under this final rule, which will guide officers in making public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with the law and based on a consideration of all relevant evidence and information.

Comment: A commenter stated while they supported preventing aliens from accessing means-tested public benefits, the proposed rule was excessive in allowing a public charge inadmissibility determination based on “mere conjectures” about future receipt of means-tested public benefits. A commenter wrote it is unlikely immigration officers are able to make reasonable assessments of the future economic and social trajectory of immigrants, reasoning that research suggests immigrants at first typically have lower than average income, but climb the income ladder and eventually need less public assistance than native-born U.S. citizens.

Response: The public charge ground of inadmissibility is a prospective determination made in the opinion of the officer. In contrast and with limited exceptions,[145] aliens are inadmissible under other grounds because of something that occurred in the past or is true at the time of adjudication. These fundamental differences between inadmissibility grounds, that some are prospective while others are not, and that some are based on belief or opinion while others are not, were established by Congress. For public charge, this has been the case since 1891, when Congress codified the provision that persons likely to become a public charge were excludable from the United States. While commenters may object to an inadmissibility ground based on a prospective determination made in the opinion of DHS officers, this is an objection to the statute, not this final rule. DHS is committed to ensuring that officers are well prepared to consistently implement the public charge ground of inadmissibility under this final rule by, among other things, USCIS issuing subregulatory guidance and providing training to its officers.

Comment: A commenter wrote the content in DHS social media posts advertising job openings for immigration officers, as well as other posts by the Secretary, suggest that DHS is encouraging employees to go beyond the bounds of the INA in looking for pretexts under the guise of discretion to deny applicants for immigration services.

Response: DHS disagrees with any suggestion that it is encouraging or instructing employees to go beyond statutory language. DHS is committed to the faithful implementation of our immigration laws, even those long ignored by previous administrations and systematically violated by categories of aliens. This final rule seeks to restore the use of the full bounds of the statute.

Comment: Multiple commenters expressed concerns that rescinding the 2022 Final Rule without offering any replacement language or guidance creates uncertainty, fear, and avoidance of applying for or receiving benefits. Several commenters expressed concern that rolling back the 2022 Final Rule without a full and clear replacement would plunge immigrant communities, legal service providers, State and local agencies, and community organizations into a state of prolonged uncertainty, preventing them from reliably advising aliens on public charge inadmissibility. A commenter wrote that the lack of clear standards will create uncertainty for many of the same groups, and specifically Members of Congress would be unable to provide constituent services and provide actionable information. Another commenter said future guidance affecting immigrant communities must be publicly released so families and advocates understand the rules and in the absence of clear regulations, USCIS should be limited to applying the statute, relevant case law, and long-established practices, not making discretionary judgments. One commenter stated allowing DHS to make substantive policy decisions without public input would undermine transparency, public accountability, and regulatory consistency. The commenter noted policies with such significant implications for immigrant communities and public health should be subject to full public scrutiny and not internal administrative discretion.

Another commenter wrote that rescinding the 2022 Final Rule without replacing it with a clear framework is not a neutral act; rather, it invites arbitrary, inconsistent, and discriminatory decision-making and undermines the fairness of the immigration system.

Response: DHS disagrees that rescinding the 2022 Final Rule without regulatory replacement creates uncertainty, inconsistency, or discrimination. In fact, we believe the opposite is true. The regulations implemented by the 2022 Final Rule were inconsistent with the national policy contained in E.O. 14218 and PRWORA and the spirit of the broad statutory text in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), by severely and unduly limiting the factors and relevant evidence DHS officers could consider in making public charge inadmissibility determinations, undermining the accuracy of such determinations. DHS agrees that officers should apply the statute, relevant case law, and any subregulatory guidance, however, public charge inadmissibility determinations necessarily rely on an officer's discretion according to the ( printed page 45357) statute. Thus, DHS completely removed the public charge inadmissibility framework established by the 2022 Final Rule (with exception of the bond provisions) to better align with PRWORA's directive that aliens are self-sufficient and to comply with section 212(a)(4)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A), which directs DHS to deny admission and adjustment of status to aliens likely at any time to become a public charge. Indeed, DHS believes the 2022 Final Rule did not faithfully implement PRWORA and section 212(a)(4)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A), insofar as they straitjacket DHS officers by limiting what public benefits DHS can consider in the totality of the circumstances and by precluding officers from considering factors beyond the seven factors outlined in the regulations.

DHS notes that while it has removed the public charge inadmissibility regulations in the short-term, in advance of or on the effective date of this final rule USCIS will publish appropriate policy and interpretive tools to guide public charge inadmissibility determinations while empowering officers to consider the mandatory statutory factors in section 212(a)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B) and all individualized case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to an alien's application, as Congress intended.[146]

Comment: Commenters expressed concerns the proposed rule is an attack on the lawful immigration system, and that such an attack would undermine, destabilize, and destroy it. Another wrote that the proposed rule would negatively impact first-generation immigrant families who rely heavily on family-based immigration to reunite families because most humanitarian pathways are exempt and because of the diminished weight given to a Form I-864 under this rule. The commenter expressed their concern that public charge inadmissibility determinations under the new approach would focus on an alien's past and current financial status, discounting studies showing that even family-based immigrants thrive economically in the United States after adjustment of status or admission. Other commenters stated that removal of the 2022 Final Rule undermines humanitarian programs.

Response: DHS disagrees. Simply put, removal of the 2022 Final Rule empowers DHS officers to make public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with the statute, congressional intent expressed in PRWORA, and precedent decisions, and does not prevent aliens who are subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility from applying for or obtaining any immigration benefit for which they demonstrate eligibility. INA sec. 291, 8 U.S.C. 1361. This rule does not alter eligibility for means-tested benefits or family-based immigration. Aliens who are beneficiaries of approved family-based immigrant petitions will still be able to apply for admission and for adjustment of status, which DHS may grant if they have demonstrated eligibility. DHS does not believe Congress intended for DHS to administer section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), in a manner that fails to account for aliens' receipt of food, medical, and housing benefits to help aliens become self-sufficient. DHS believes that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will ultimately strengthen the legal immigration system by ensuring that aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge are refused admission or denied adjustment of status.

As for humanitarian programs,[147] Congress exempted aliens applying for many of these humanitarian benefits from the public charge ground of inadmissibility.[148] Therefore, DHS rejects the idea that modifying how DHS officers make public charge inadmissibility determinations will impact, much less undermine, humanitarian programs to which the public charge ground does not even apply.

Comment: One commenter stated removing the 2022 public charge inadmissibility regulations would force USCIS into deeper backlogs hurting immigrants and U.S. citizens alike, while other commenters voiced concern with increased operational burdens, processing delays and longer processing times, and backlogs resulting from the proposed rule. A commenter said this rule is a waste of time, resources, and public money, while others stated the lack of clear guidance and case-by-base public charge inadmissibility decisions would increase administrative burdens on USCIS, adjudications, and legal challenges, reducing efficiency.

Other commenters stated that the increased discretion afforded to immigration officers under the proposed rule would result in longer and less reliable adjudications. Another commenter warned that the expanded evidentiary requirements under the proposed rule could lead to longer processing times, increased case backlogs, and higher operational costs. The commenter said, in turn, these burdens could negatively impact families, employers, and community institutions that depend on predictable and efficient immigration processing.

A commenter requested that DHS implement a new framework that avoids creating new burdens. Some commenters stated that the rule would impose a substantial new workload on USCIS, which is already backlogged in adjudicating applications, the cost analysis in the rule addresses only the costs to the public, not the administrative costs to USCIS of implementing the rule, and that officers would be required to parse through details of public benefits programs, ( printed page 45358) which is outside of their job description, and analyze more voluminous records, which increases time and resource burdens.

Response: DHS disagrees that removing the regulatory framework and relying on the statute and binding precedent, is more burdensome than the 2022 Final Rule's framework. Now that the 2022 Final Rule has been rescinded and removed, DHS has restored a broad public charge inadmissibility determination in which officers consider the statutorily mandated factors, the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits, and any other factor(s) an officer determines, in his or her discretion, is relevant to assessing an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. As was the case prior to the rescission, DHS will make public charge inadmissibility determinations based on information collected on the alien's Form I-485, Form I-693, information from DHS's systems, and any other supporting information submitted or obtained during adjudication. DHS acknowledges that it has revised Form I-485 to require additional information that officers will consider in the totality of the circumstances but believes that public charge inadmissibility determinations under this final rule will not result in a significant increase in the information collection burden.

To the extent this rule could initially cause backlogs, DHS believes any resource burdens associated with removal of the 2022 Final Rule are justified. In removing the rigid regulations that straitjacketed USCIS officers' ability to apply the public charge statute as Congress intended, DHS officers will ensure aliens in the United States are truly self-sufficient,[149] not dependent on public resources,[150] and that aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge are neither admitted nor permitted to adjust their status, as Congress intended. While implementation of the rule may initially increase USCIS processing times, such is the burden of robust enforcement of the laws that Congress set in PRWORA and IIRIRA. DHS is committed to ensuring officers have the necessary resources to timely and efficiently adjudicate applications for immigration benefits. USCIS will provide guidance and training to officers in the transition, as it generally does in such situations, ameliorating commenters' concerns. Furthermore, to ensure consistency and quality control, USCIS will monitor adjudications and apply its general quality control processes. USCIS will continually assess and improve the adjudication processes, procedures, and training.

Comment: One commenter noted that this rule would be less predictable and therefore lead to more requests for evidence, appeals, and legal challenges. This commenter stated that this rule would lead to more discretionary denials, which results in more follow-up filings and delays, which adds months or years to processing times and to delays. A commenter stated that the rule would significantly increase the paperwork burden on officers and would lead to inconsistent adjudication that could increase litigation, and cause delays in processing, creating larger backlogs in immigration processing. One commenter said the operational burden associated with the removal of the 2022 Final Rule could negatively impact families, employers, and community institutions that depend on predictable and efficient immigration processing.

Response: DHS disagrees that removal of the 2022 Final Rule results in an unpredictable approach to public charge inadmissibility determinations that will lead to the issuance of more requests for evidence or increased “paperwork burden” on officers. As noted in the NPRM, in adjudicating adjustment of status applications, USCIS will consider the statutory minimum factors, the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, and all other information relevant to assessing the alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the circumstances, consistent with governing precedent. 90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025). INA secs. 212(a)(4)(B) and 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B) and 1182(s). For example, USCIS will continue to use information from the alien's Form I-693, Report of Immigration Medical Examination and Vaccination Record, and Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, as well as any information obtained during an interview to assess the alien's age, health, family status, assets, resources, and financial status, education and skills, receipt of any means-tested public benefits. And as is true in with any immigration benefit USCIS adjudicates, officers may request additional evidence relating to the statutorily mandated factors or any other factor the officer determines is relevant to assessing whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. 90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025). See also8 CFR 103.2(b)(8).

Furthermore, DHS believes that the statute and the governing precedent decisions pertaining to public charge inadmissibility determinations provide officers with sufficient guidance. These authorities as well as the relevant information collections similarly provide adequate notice to the aliens applying for adjustment of status about what information USCIS will consider when conducting public charge inadmissibility determinations. Aliens applying for adjustment of status may need to become familiar with these authorities and the information collections and instructions to understand what evidence they need to submit to demonstrate that they are not likely at any time to become a public charge. USCIS will also issue subregulatory guidance, which will go into effect on the effective date of this final rule.

Aliens applying for adjustment of status should expect to fully complete their Form I-485 and provide any required supporting evidence, as well as provide any evidence in their possession that pertains to their self-sufficiency and likelihood of becoming a public charge. So long as aliens provide this information, DHS disagrees with the commenter's characterization that the return to a faithful public charge inadmissibility determination will result in more RFEs or subsequent filings.

With respect to the commenter's claim the rulemaking will result in more appeals or legal challenges, DHS notes a denial of an application for admission or adjustment of status generally cannot be appealed.[151] Upon denial of an alien's application for adjustment of status, if removable, USCIS can issue a Notice to Appear (NTA) and place the alien in removal proceedings.[152] In removal proceedings, the alien can challenge the basis for removal and, if found removable, file the application for adjustment with the Immigration Judge. See INA secs. 240(c)(3) and (4), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(3) and (4). With respect to litigation, this final rule was carefully developed to reflect a faithful interpretation of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), PRWORA, and congressional intent. DHS also considered statutes, precedent ( printed page 45359) decisions, decades-long agency practices, and legislative materials to ensure the final rule is consistent with congressional objectives. DHS recognizes certain individuals and groups may object to any faithful implementation of our country's immigration laws and may raise their objections in court. However, we expect the rule's reasonable standards will support effective implementation and enforcement, consistent with the statutory framework established by Congress.

As to the commenter's suggestion that this final rule could negatively impact families, employers, and community institutions because it would result in inefficiency in immigration processing, while implementation of the rule may initially increase USCIS processing times, such is the burden of robust enforcement of the laws that Congress established in PRWORA and IIRIRA. DHS is committed to ensuring officers have the necessary resources to timely and efficiently adjudicate applications for immigration benefits. USCIS will provide guidance and training to officers in the transition, as it generally does in such situations, ameliorating commenters' concerns.

Comment: A commenter stated numerous Federal documents frequently cite the regulations in question and updating those documents would waste resources.

Response: DHS recognizes Federal agencies have numerous documents and resources citing to or referencing regulations promulgated in the now-rescinded 2022 Final Rule. DHS further recognizes Federal agencies will need to expend resources to update agency guidance and informational resources for any regulatory change. DHS does not anticipate a substantial expenditure of resources unique to this final rule and will ensure it employs efficient strategies to update its documents and resources to reflect rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. Should DHS, particularly USCIS, be unable to recover the full costs associated with implementing this final rule, the agency will propose to adjust the associated form fees in a subsequent fee rule. USCIS establishes its fees by assigning costs to an adjudication based on its relative adjudication burden and the use of resources. Additionally, DHS will work with other Federal agencies to ensure awareness of the rescission and assist them as needed with updating their materials.

Comment: A commenter wrote that the rule removes language excluding nonimmigrants from the public charge ground of inadmissibility, impacting international students and scholars. The commenter reasoned that subjecting these individuals to a public charge determination would be a waste of DHS's resources as international students must provide evidence of sufficient funds to support themselves throughout their course of study. Another commenter requested that F and J categories of visas be excluded from the proposed rule since international students and scholars already have to provide proof of financial self-sufficiency. Another commenter said broad officer discretion could lead to negative consequences for international students, including scrutiny of legitimate funding sources like scholarships, stipends, or assistantships, negative impacts on dependents, and uncertainty affecting future benefits for the student such as Optional Practical Training (OPT), H-1B, or adjustment of status.

Response: DHS believes the first commenter misunderstood the scope of the 2022 Final Rule which did not exclude nonimmigrants, including international students and scholars, from the public charge ground of inadmissibility. Under the plain language of the statute, the public charge ground of inadmissibility applies to applicants for visas (immigrant and nonimmigrant), admission, or adjustment of status unless expressly exempt in statute. Categorically excluding individuals seeking admission under the F and J categories would be contrary to the statute.[153] Therefore, public charge inadmissibility determinations established by this rulemaking necessarily apply to nonimmigrants seeking admission at a port of entry, unless the alien is exempt from this ground of inadmissibility. However, this final rule does not regulate universities nor the eligibility for, or amount of, financial aid awards or the availability of internships or other work experience. The requirement for students to support themselves during studies is evaluated by consular officers at Department of State prior to issuing the nonimmigrant visa and, while possible, it is unlikely a CBP officer would later find the alien inadmissible at a port of entry under section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), barring additional information or changed circumstances.

Comment: Commenters expressed concerns: the rulemaking is against our values (including fairness and opportunity), founding principles, and is intended to punish poor immigrants and deter them from entering the United States. Another warned that proposed changes would shift the immigration system toward a model that prioritizes evaluating immigrants on wealth, over other traditional markers of successful assimilation, such as potential, character, and contributions. A commenter said the rule disproportionately burdens low-income individuals, people with disabilities, caregivers, and marginalized communities without a legitimate governmental justification, and wealth-based exclusion mechanisms have consistently been viewed with constitutional skepticism. A commenter stated that the uncertainty and individual discretion in immigration decisions resulting from the proposed rule would run contrary to democratic values.

Response: DHS strongly disagrees this rule is intended to punish anyone, including marginalized communities, or is inconsistent with American values. DHS, in fact, notes this rule is consistent with statutory language and longstanding national policy since the earliest immigration laws that aliens within the United States are self-sufficient and not dependent on public resources to meet their needs. See8 U.S.C. 1601(2)(A) and (5). Congress first created immigration restrictions based on an alien's likelihood of becoming a public charge in the Immigration Act of 1882, which authorized exclusion of “any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge.” [154] Congress expanded on this point in 1996 when enacting PRWORA by stating aliens generally should not depend on public resources and the availability of public benefits should not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States. SeePublic Law 104-193, sec. 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601). Further, DHS does not believe this final rule is contrary to democratic values. DHS's interpretation and application of the public charge inadmissibility ground in this rulemaking is properly guided by the more than a century-old history of this provision, the current statutory language at section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), relevant case law, and Congress's express statements of national policy with respect to immigration and welfare.

As noted previously, to the extent that public charge inadmissibility determinations disproportionately affect ( printed page 45360) aliens with lower incomes, DHS notes it is Congress, not DHS, that mandated consideration of an alien's assets, resources, and financial status in public charge inadmissibility determinations. See INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B)(i)(IV), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(i)(IV). Therefore, in following the express language of the statute, DHS will continue to consider an alien's assets, resources, and financial status, the other statutorily-mandated factors, the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, as well as any other case-specific factor that is relevant, in the officer's discretion, to assessing whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge in the totality of the circumstances.

An officer would not conclude that an alien is inadmissible as likely at any time to become a public charge solely because that alien is low income.[155] Indeed, to deny an alien admission or adjustment of status solely because the alien has lower income would be inconsistent with statutory language and longstanding binding precedent that DHS will continue to follow.[156] Instead, as reflected in the NPRM,[157] officers would make public charge inadmissibility determinations considering all relevant factors, including the statutorily mandated factors, the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, and any other relevant factor, in the totality of the circumstances.[158]

Comment: Another commenter said this rule is contrary to family unity goals of section 201(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1151. Another commenter stated that DHS should retain the 2022 Final Rule because unlike the framework DHS proposed in the NPRM, the 2022 Final Rule protects family unity.

Response: DHS strongly disagrees that this rule seeks to undermine opportunity, fairness, or family unity. DHS acknowledges that the INA provides certain aliens with the opportunity to come to and remain in the United States temporarily and permanently in furtherance of such ideals as family unity.[159] However, DHS must emphasize that this rule does not and cannot alter the process and requirements for obtaining immediate relative, family-sponsored, employment-based, diversity, or nonimmigrant visas, or humanitarian relief as provided for in the statute; aliens will still be able to apply for any benefit for which they are eligible and DHS will continue to grant immigration benefits to aliens who have demonstrated eligibility for such benefits.[160] Importantly, the INA precludes certain aliens from obtaining those family unity and humanitarian benefits. For example, unless an exception applies or a waiver is available, aliens seeking admission and adjustment of status as family-based immigrants are inadmissible and ineligible if they have committed certain criminal offenses, have been diagnosed with a communicable disease of public health significance, and, as important here, are likely at any time to become a public charge.[161] These grounds of inadmissibility are valid exercises of congressional authority, notwithstanding that such grounds of inadmissibility may prevent aliens from obtaining these family-based benefits that Congress has made available.

Because Congress has for over a century determined that aliens who are likely to become a public charge should be precluded from obtaining certain immigration benefits, including those intending to promote family unity, DHS is required to enforce this basis for inadmissibility when determining which aliens to admit or adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident. Through this rule, DHS is exercising its statutory authority to administer the public charge ground of inadmissibility in the manner that Congress intended. To the extent that commenters are concerned about this rule's impact on aliens' ability to obtain immigration benefits provided under the INA, DHS also notes that the public charge inadmissibility ground does not apply to all aliens who are seeking a visa, admission, or adjustment of status. Congress specifically exempted certain groups, e.g., refugees and asylees at the time of admission and adjustment of status. INA secs. 207(c)(3) and 209(c), 8 U.S.C. 1157(c)(3) and 1159(c).

Comment: Commenters stated it is contrary to the spirit of U.S. immigration law to treat short-term, lawful benefit use as a negative factor in a public charge inadmissibility determination. Others expressed concern that the proposed rule is an abandonment of longstanding immigration policy and severely harms aliens who rely on social safety services to contribute to the country over the course of their lives. Two others wrote that this rule would unravel decades of sound and settled public policy clearly outlining which public benefits may be used without causing negative immigration consequences.

Response: DHS disagrees that considering an alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits in a public charge inadmissibility determination is contrary to the spirit of longstanding immigration policy. An alien's receipt of public benefits has been a consideration in public charge inadmissibility determinations dating back to the earliest immigration laws.[162] Further, DHS considers the factors in the totality of the circumstances, where receipt of any means-tested public benefits by an alien is considered but not outcome determinative.[163]

DHS would not conclude an alien is inadmissible under the public charge ground simply because that alien received a means-tested public benefit. 90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025). Instead, as noted in the NPRM and following past precedent, DHS officers would look at the circumstances surrounding the alien's receipt, e.g., nature of the benefit, whether it is the type of benefit that alone or in combination with other benefits meets the alien's basic needs, the recency, duration, and amount of receipt, the reason for the receipt, and whether the ( printed page 45361) reason has or is likely to persist, etc. 90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025).

Comment: Commenters expressed concern that the proposed rule is a departure from the United States' historic commitment to welcoming immigrants and recognition of immigrant contributions, in that a narrow and punitive interpretation of “public charge” fails to reflect the nation's historical understanding of immigrants as long-term contributors to the economy and society. A commenter expressed concern that the proposed changes would radically reshape the legal immigration system and redefine who is “worthy” of being a U.S. citizen, along with what the country looks like.

Response: DHS disagrees. DHS acknowledges immigrants have made and continue to make critical contributions to the U.S. economy and workforce. Immigrants, taken as a whole, are a net positive for the U.S. economy as well as government budgets, filling critical gaps in the U.S. labor market. However, Congress determined which aliens should be admitted into the United States or granted adjustment of status and which aliens are inadmissible and, therefore, ineligible for admission and adjustment of status. The faithful application of the statutory provisions rendering aliens inadmissible to the United States is critical to ensuring that immigration continues to serve as a positive force for our economy and country as a whole.

Aliens likely at any time to become a public charge are among those categories of aliens whom Congress determined should not be admitted or permitted to adjust their status. Furthermore, it is our longstanding national policy on immigration and welfare that aliens within the United States should not depend on public resources to meet their needs but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations. The public charge ground of inadmissibility is an important tool established by Congress to minimize the presence in the United States of aliens who lack self-sufficiency and are likely to rely on the government to meet their needs. It is Congress, not DHS, who has established the eligibility criteria determining who is “worthy” to be admitted to the United States or to adjust their status. By faithfully implementing the public charge ground of inadmissibility, DHS helps ensure aliens admitted to the United States or granted adjustment of status are the aliens who would contribute to the economy and workforce.

Comment: Numerous commenters expressed concern that the proposed rule's perceived ambiguity around which forms of assistance may be considered and whether receiving public benefits on behalf of family members could negatively affect an applicant would lead to a “chilling effect” that would discourage immigrants from accessing essential health, nutrition, and housing services, despite being legally eligible to receive them. Citing studies and research, many commenters asserted that the chilling effect will increase hunger, food insecurity, homelessness and poverty, create uncertainty or fear among immigrants, leading them to forego benefits or programs they help fund through taxes, and discourage families from accessing essential services to avoid risking their immigration status or the status of family members. Another commenter quoted the NPRM, that the “elimination of certain definitions may lead to public confusion or misunderstanding of the proposed rule, which could result in decreased participation in public benefit programs by individuals who are not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility.”

Response: With respect to the rule's potential “chilling effects”, DHS points to our national policy on welfare and immigration as set forth in PRWORA as a sufficient basis to move forward with this final rule. SeePublic Law 104-193, sec. 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601).

DHS acknowledges the final rule may indeed produce indirect effects on the receipt of means-tested public benefits. Moreover, individuals who might choose to disenroll from or forgo future enrollment in a public benefits program may include aliens as well as U.S. citizen members of mixed-status households. However, as stated in the NPRM, DHS believes the regulations implemented by the 2022 Final Rule are inconsistent with the national policy contained in E.O. 14218, PRWORA, and both the language and spirit of the broad statutory text in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), because it severely and unduly limited the factors DHS could consider in making a public charge inadmissibility determination. The 2022 Final Rule, at best, discouraged and, at worst, prevented DHS officers from considering relevant evidence essential to making an accurate and valid public charge inadmissibility determination consistent with the statute, the spirit of PRWORA, and past precedent decisions.

Although individuals may reconsider their receipt of public benefits in light of future immigration consequences, this rule does not prohibit an alien from obtaining any public benefit for which he or she is eligible. To the extent that aliens subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility decide to forego means-tested public benefits on behalf of their U.S. citizen children or to the extent that aliens' family members disenroll from means-tested public family members for which they are eligible, such choices would be unreasonable where DHS has communicated in this rule, and will communicate in future guidance, that such receipt will not be considered except in limited circumstances. Regardless, DHS declines to limit the effect of the rulemaking to avoid the possibility that aliens subject to this rule may disenroll or choose not to enroll in public benefit programs as confirming self-sufficiency is the rule's ultimate aim. DHS also declines to limit the effect of the rule to avoid the possibility that individuals who are not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility will choose not to receive means-tested public benefits, as DHS believes that this risk is outweighed by the benefits of the rule.

However, DHS notes that the subregulatory guidance that USCIS will issue in the USCIS Policy Manual, which will apply to USCIS adjudications of adjustment of status applications, will provide the regulated public with sufficient information to understand whose benefits will and will not be considered in an alien's public charge inadmissibility determination. Sharing this information is intended to help individuals who are not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility understand that it does not apply to them, allowing them to make informed decisions. Additionally, DHS encourages nonprofit organizations that assist aliens to also provide information and disseminate the guidance that USCIS will issue to help aliens and their families understand how public charge inadmissibility determinations will be made under this final rule.

Comment: Another commenter reasoned that recent policy shifts eliminated automatic extensions for numerous Employment Authorization Document (EAD) categories, shortened validity periods, led to longer ( printed page 45362) processing times, and resulted in periods of unemployment, forcing many aliens to depend on public benefits to meet their families' basic needs, despite being ready, willing, and able to legally work. Yet, the commenter said, immigrants may be discouraged from applying for these benefits under the proposed rule, risking food insecurity, housing instability, and other serious harms to protect their immigration status.

Response: DHS acknowledges that aliens with gaps in employment due to difficulties obtaining EADs may experience periods of financial need during which aliens need to rely on resources other than their own to meet their needs. However, consistent with PRWORA, aliens should not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their families, their sponsors, and private organizations during those times. See8 U.S.C. 1601. DHS will consider the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits in the totality of the circumstances. DHS emphasizes under applicable precedent and as discussed in the NPRM, the fact that an alien received means-tested public benefits is not by itself outcome determinative.[164] DHS will also consider the type of benefit received, the circumstances under which the alien received those benefits, the duration and amount of receipt, as well as the statutory factors and any other factor the officer determines, in his or her discretion, is relevant to assessing the alien's likelihood of at any time becoming a public charge, including prior employment history.

Comment: Many commenters expressed concern that the rule is counterproductive, cruel, not aligned with public health stewardship, and adversely impacts public health, requested the rule explicitly exclude health and nutrition programs from the public charge inadmissibility determination to protect public health and food security as healthcare is a basic and fundamental need, and pointed out the need for clarity that existed in the previous regulations to prevent widespread fear, harm, and confusion. Several commenters were concerned about the rule undermining the trust in public healthcare systems. A commenter noted that programs like Medicaid are not signs of dependency but are rather essential supports promoting public health, child development, workforce participation, and community well-being. Commenters listed negative consequences for removing the regulations that they claimed provided clarity and excluded consideration of the receipt of Medicaid from a public charge inadmissibility determination, including a higher prevalence of communicable diseases due to lower vaccination rates and increased spread of preventable illness, lower rates of seeking regular health checks or necessary care, poorer long-term health outcomes, declination of lifesaving services or necessary prescriptions, an increase in the prevalence of obesity and malnutrition, decreased use of or increased barriers to mental health treatment, and increased deaths due to avoidance of emergency treatment. Many commenters stated the rule would also exacerbate food insecurity, housing instability, and poverty, linking those to long-term health conditions like diabetes, obesity, hypertension, chronic kidney disease, and depression that would impact overall U.S. public health. Others noted some aliens pay taxes and should be allowed to access tax-funded healthcare.

Commenters stated that lawfully present families are already losing or avoiding health coverage because of policy uncertainty and cited the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF)/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants [165] to point to the number of lawfully present immigrants who are now uninsured, or who have said they are delaying needed care because of immigration concerns. Some commenters stated the rule would harm people living with HIV and undermines the Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. federal initiative by deterring people living with and vulnerable to HIV from accessing health insurance and vital public programs designed to allow individuals to stay in care, sustain viral suppression, and be self-sufficient. They stated that these programs are important to end the HIV epidemic, improve quality of life for people living with HIV, and that the rule would ultimately lead to treatment interruptions, increased transmission rates, preventable deaths, and increased healthcare costs.

Response: DHS disagrees the rule is not aligned with American values or is counterproductive or cruel. As reflected in E.O. 14218, the Trump Administration is taking steps to “uphold the rule of law, defend against the waste of hard-earned taxpayer resources, and protect benefits for American citizens in need, including individuals with disabilities and veterans.” See90 FR 10581, 10581 (Feb. 25, 2025). Through this rule, DHS ensures aliens are self-sufficient and not admitted or granted adjustment if they are likely at any time to become a public charge. 8 U.S.C. 1601.

DHS also disagrees that the rule will undermine the trust in public healthcare systems. This rule in no way restricts access to medical treatment or vaccines for children or adults, and this rule is not intended to discourage individuals from obtaining necessary healthcare to prevent communicable diseases.

Additionally, this rulemaking does not prevent aliens from obtaining any means-tested public benefits for which they are eligible under PRWORA. Although DHS acknowledges that the final rule, once effective, may lead individuals to disenroll or choose to forgo enrollment from public benefits for which they are eligible, the rule does not change eligibility requirements for any public benefits. The rule only clarifies how officers will determine whether an alien seeking admission or adjustment of status is inadmissible, which is a separate determination Congress has authorized DHS to make.

Comment: Some commenters stated the rule undermines the goals of the Make America Healthy Again initiative, and one commenter added it contradicts the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) work to increase access to affordable coverage and attain better health outcomes. One commenter stated the rule reverses progress made on health equity among different populations. Similarly, one commenter was concerned about the rule resulting in increased risk of communicable disease spread in dense urban areas and another raised the risk of detrimental effects on healthcare in rural areas.

Response: DHS disagrees the rule undermines the goals of Make America Healthy Again initiative. E.O. 14212 establishes the Make America Healthy Again Commission to aggressively ( printed page 45363) combat the critical health challenges facing our citizens in the United States. This rule does not regulate eligibility for, or access to, public benefits. DHS reiterates that this rule does not prevent individuals who are eligible for public benefits from receiving these benefits and therefore does not undermine the public health goals set forth in the Make America Healthy Again initiative, nor does this rule contradict the work of HHS to enact such policy.

This rule is consistent with the Government's interest and congressional intent, as set forth in PRWORA, to: (1) minimize the incentive of aliens to immigrate to the United States due to the availability of public benefits; and (2) promote the self-sufficiency of aliens within the United States. See8 U.S.C. 1601. DHS acknowledges that aliens subject to this rule may decline to enroll in, or may choose to disenroll from, means-tested public benefits for which they may be eligible under PRWORA, in order to avoid negative consequences as a result of this final rule. However, DHS has authority to take past, current, and likely future receipt of means-tested public benefits into account, even where it may ultimately result in discouraging aliens from receiving those benefits.[166] Additionally, DHS disagrees that this rule will cause an increased risk of communicable disease among aliens to whom this rule applies. Aliens applying for adjustment of status are required to obtain an immigration medical examination and establish that they are not inadmissible under section 212(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(1). Therefore, DHS believes that these aliens would still take preventive measures against and/or seek proper treatment of communicable diseases, regardless of means-tested public benefit disenrollment, in order to remain admissible to the United States. For these reasons, DHS declines to limit the effect of the rulemaking to avoid the possibility that individuals subject to this rule may disenroll or choose not to enroll because self-sufficiency is the rule's goal.

Comment: Many commenters expressed concerns about disenrollment effects on immigrant children, saying that disenrollment from Medicaid would increase children's rates of hunger, housing insecurity, poor health outcomes, and reduce access to routine check-ups, vision and oral care, and treatment for chronic conditions, while others said disenrollment would harm children's educational attainment, long-term success, overall well-being and development, and vaccination rates. One commenter said that Medicaid coverage is associated with lower rates of asthma among children. Others remarked that Medicaid is critical for providing behavioral health services to children. Some said the chilling effects would increase childhood stressors and trauma, while introducing new behavioral challenges and social deficits, with one commenter stating that fear of seeking assistance and consequent material hardship would raise stress for parents, harming parent-child relationships and, in turn, child development. Many commenters cited studies and expressed concern that health coverage and care avoidance would harm immigrant children, with some stating that disenrollment and care avoidance would decrease the frequency of children's primary and preventive care visits. Commenters remarked that public health insurance coverage has a positive relationship with children's educational attainment and children with health coverage have higher survival rates during emergencies. Commenters expressed concerns that the rule would lead to avoidance of energy assistance programs among immigrant populations and described the importance of those programs for family health outcomes and child development. Commenters cited studies discussing how childhood programs improved early cognitive development, social skills, behavior programs, health, language skills, math and English-language achievements, lifetime educational attainment, and employment outcomes and income in adulthood. Commenters stated that childhood Medicaid enrollment reduces hospitalizations and development of chronic adult health issues, delinquency and crime, and diagnoses of attention disorders and developmental delays. They also cited studies that found an association between Medicaid enrollment and lowered chances of developing high blood pressure, having difficulty walking, and experiencing early mortality as adults.

Response: DHS recognizes that many of the public benefit programs aim to better future economic and health outcomes for children and parents may decide to disenroll their children from these programs to avoid negative immigration consequences. However, this rule is aimed at ensuring that public charge inadmissibility determinations are consistent with Congress's intent in the INA, IIRIRA, and PRWORA. This rule restores broader discretion to evaluate all relevant facts and circumstances in assessing an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge and aligns with long-standing policy that aliens should be self-reliant and government benefits should not incentivize immigration. See8 U.S.C. 1601. This rule does not prevent any individual, including a child, who is eligible for health or nutrition programs from applying for or receiving benefits, but rather faithfully implements the statute after rescission of the overly-restrictive 2022 Final Rule. DHS is implementing the above-referenced congressional directive in PRWORA. DHS believes that the 2022 Final Rule did not faithfully implement PRWORA and section 212(a)(4)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A), insofar as it straitjacketed officers by limiting which public benefits considered in the totality of the circumstances and by precluding officers from considering factors beyond the seven factors outlined in the regulations.

DHS also notes that the public charge inadmissibility ground does not apply to all applicants who are seeking a visa, admission, or adjustment of status. Congress specifically exempted certain groups from this ground of inadmissibility, e.g., refugees and asylees at the time of admission and adjustment of status, pursuant to sections 207(c)(3) and 209(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1157(c)(3) and 1159(c). To the extent that these commenters are concerned with the application of the public charge inadmissibility ground to children, DHS notes that Congress did not exclude children from the public charge ground of inadmissibility unless the child is applying for admission or adjustment of status under a category Congress expressly exempted from public charge inadmissibility. Moreover, Congress specifically required that DHS consider an applicant's age in the public charge inadmissibility determination. Additionally, as discussed in other comment responses, DHS notes it will only consider receipt of means-tested public benefits by family members to the extent there is evidence in the record an alien's family member whom the alien is legally obligated to support applied for, was approved or certified to receive, or has received or is currently receiving means-tested public benefits due to the alien's income falling below ( printed page 45364) a certain threshold.[167] In such cases, DHS would consider the alien's financial status that led to his or her family member needing to apply for or receive those benefits as part of DHS' consideration of the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances.[168]

Comment: A few commenters expressed concerns regarding how homelessness and housing instability impacts children and remarked housing stability is a significant predictor of academic achievement, with one commenter reasoning that housing instability interferes with children's ability to attend school, complete homework, and build connections with educators and peers. A few commenters added that children whose families receive housing assistance are more likely to have a healthy weight, improved mental health outcomes, educational gains in math and language arts, and higher earning and educational attainment, along with a lower chance of incarceration in adulthood. Some referenced a study that found that in households where caregivers reported receipt of heat or energy assistance, children had healthier weights and lower rates of acute hospitalization.

Response: To the extent the commenters believe this rule would be responsible for housing instability and homelessness, DHS notes the rule does not instruct aliens to forgo applying for or receiving means-tested public benefits that address housing instability and homelessness for which they are eligible. If an alien received such means-tested public benefits, it is because the alien applied for and was determined eligible for those benefits by the benefit providing agency.

Additionally, as discussed in the NPRM, DHS assessed the rule's effect on children and determined that the rule may negatively impact the health and education opportunities for children, including U.S. citizen children. DHS believes that some of these potential impacts could be mitigated by clear communication regarding the application of the final rule and how the public charge inadmissibility determinations work in the totality of the circumstances. Ultimately, however, DHS continues to believe that any impact on children is outweighed by the compelling legal and policy reasons associated with this rulemaking, including but not limited to, better ensuring self-sufficiency. DHS's intent is to implement Congress's mandate to assess whether an alien has met his or her burden to demonstrate that he or she is not likely at any time to become a public charge under section 212(a)(4)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A), given the congressional policy to ensure those coming to the United States should be self-sufficient and not rely on the government for assistance to meet their needs.

DHS also notes Congress, not DHS, both permitted certain limited categories of aliens to receive means-tested public benefits and subjected the same aliens to the public charge ground of inadmissibility. Although aliens may reconsider receiving means-tested public benefits for which they are eligible due to how it impacts their eligibility for immigration benefits, this rule does not prohibit aliens from receiving any public benefit for which Congress made them eligible.

As noted in the NPRM, in determining whether an alien applying for admission or adjustment of status is likely at any time to become a public charge, DHS considers the statutory minimum factors and all other information relevant to assessing an applicant's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the circumstances, including the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, consistent with governing precedent. 90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025). INA secs. 212(a)(4)(B) and 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B) and 1182(s).

Comment: A few commenters expressed concern that parents would withdraw children from early childhood education programs such as Head Start for fear of jeopardizing immigration status. Others remarked that early education and child care programs support child development and improve school readiness and academic performance while supporting parents who work and pursue education. Further describing the benefits of Head Start, a few commenters remarked Head Start participants have improved educational attainment, are less likely to be incarcerated, and less likely to depend on public assistance as adults. One commenter described the importance of programs such as the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG), saying that CCDBG helps parents afford quality child care, and without access to these services, families face difficult decisions about participating in the workforce or leaving children in suboptimal care settings, anticipating that many families would forgo care through the CCDBG, despite their U.S. citizen children being eligible. One organization commented the rule would be detrimental because poverty-related conditions, including untreated health and mental health needs, may be mischaracterized as neglect by child welfare agencies.

A few commenters expressed concerns the rule would reduce families' willingness and ability to use early intervention (EI) programs because it was unclear if enrollment in EI services would be included in the scope of a public charge inadmissibility determination. Others expressed concerns of confusion regarding whether State-based financial aid could be considered in the scope of a public charge inadmissibility determination, warning that this would deter immigrants or U.S. citizen children from pursuing higher education.

A professional healthcare organization expressed concern that the proposed rule would lead to uncertainty and confusion, deterring families from accessing critical medical care needed for children with kidney disease.

Multiple commenters described the long-term economic and health benefits of programs supporting children. A form letter campaign and a commenter stated nutrition programs are an investment in the health, well-being, and development of communities, with every $1 spent on Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) generating an estimated $2.48 in medical, educational, and productivity savings, concluding “the proposed rule would reverse decades of progress in reducing hunger and poverty, leading to a hungrier, sicker, and poorer nation.”

Commenters cited research showing children's access to public health insurance and Medicaid improved health outcomes and reduced government costs, including a study showing that access to food stamps in early childhood produced significant improvements in education, income, home ownership, neighborhood quality, and life expectancy, with every dollar invested generating $62 in societal benefits. A different commenter explained that early education programs such as Head Start result in reduced ( printed page 45365) delinquency and crime. Another wrote that with fewer students enrolled in Medicaid, the amount of funding schools receive to pay for health services and staff decreases. One commenter stated that State expenditures would increase due to the need to provide services to children without medical care or access to food assistance, and more spending on special education services and school nurses.

Commenters remarked that early education programs operate on thin margins and rely on enrollment to stay open, retain staff, and maintain quality, with one suggesting the rule would discourage families from accessing these resources, reduce enrollment, destabilize funding, and accelerate program closures. Others wrote that the rule would negatively impact children's ability to learn in the classroom. Different commenters stated that higher participation in school food programs strengthens program finances by increasing Federal revenues, generating economies of scale that reduce the cost of preparing and serving meals. Others stated the use of direct certification for eligibility in nutrition support programs in schools reduce individual family paperwork, unpaid meal debt, and the need to count and document each meal served to determine what tier of reimbursement they qualify for and in turn saves local and Federal resources.

Response: This rule restores broad discretion to evaluate all pertinent facts and aligns with long-standing policy that aliens in the United States should be self-reliant and government benefits should not incentivize immigration. It does not prevent any alien eligible for means-tested public benefits from applying for or receiving benefits. DHS is implementing the congressional directive in PRWORA that aliens in the United States should not depend on public resources to meet their needs. DHS believes the 2022 Final Rule did not faithfully implement PRWORA and section 212(a)(4)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A), insofar as they straitjacketed DHS officers by limiting what public benefits DHS can consider in the totality of the circumstances and by precluding officers from considering factors beyond the seven outlined in the rule. Through this final rule, DHS seeks to better ensure applicants are self-sufficient. DHS also notes that the public charge inadmissibility ground does not apply to all applicants who are seeking a visa, admission, or adjustment of status. Congress specifically exempted certain groups, e.g., refugees and asylees at the time of admission and adjustment of status, pursuant to sections 207(c)(3) and 209(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1157(c)(3), 1159(c).

Comment: Commenters described general impacts the proposed rule's disenrollment effect would have on immigrant communities, including increased rates of poverty, housing instability, hunger, and poor health outcomes. Others stated that the rule would foster fear, confusion, or uncertainty in mixed-status households and deter access to benefits among eligible U.S. citizens and LPRs. Another noted that exempt populations may live with non-exempt immigrants and avoid public services out of fear of jeopardizing others' immigration status. Numerous commenters, stated the proposed rule would cause families to worry that services and benefits received by family members, including U.S. citizen children, would be held against them in a public charge assessment, leading families to forgo benefits and care. A few commenters reasoned that the chilling effect of the proposed rule would fall hardest on U.S. citizen children, since, as citizens, they are currently eligible for the widest range of public services.

Commenters stated removing the explicit clarification that benefits on behalf of family members was not considered “receipt,” leaves immigrants unable to determine whether the use of benefits by family members would harm them when seeking LPR status, and providers are less able to offer them meaningful advice or reassurance. They referenced participation in programs like SNAP, Medicaid, CHIP, and WIC, which declined at much higher rates for citizen children with aliens parents than for households with only U.S. citizens in 2019. Citing survey results from the Urban Institute, commenters remarked that during that time, nearly three quarters of adults in immigrant families with children did not understand that their children's participation in public benefits programs would not be considered in parents' public charge inadmissibility determinations.

While discussing concerns with the removal of the definition of “receipt,” many commenters cited research, studies, or anecdotal evidence describing potential chilling effects associated with the removal. Commenters shared evidence of chilling effects after the publication of the 2019 Final Rule on healthcare, SNAP, Medicaid, CHIP, and WIC receipt among eligible individuals, including U.S. citizen children with disabilities. Commenters also articulated concerns on chilling impacts for individuals with chronic diseases, people with disabilities, older adults, caregivers, and care workers, with outcomes running counter to public health goals. They stated that immigrant caregivers may be concerned their eligible family member's use of Medicaid home and community based services (HCBS) would be considered receipt of public benefits for the caregiver themselves. Commenters cautioned removing the definition of “receipt” would create a level of ambiguity that would lead families with mixed immigration status to self-evict from federally subsidized homes, leading to increased instability and poor outcomes in health, education, and employment. Commenters requested DHS provide explicit assurances in the regulations and guidance use of public benefits by a family member will not be held against applicants in a public charge inadmissibility determination or receipt of such benefits carry less weight than if the applicant received them.

Response: DHS thanks the commenters for expressing concerns about how the elimination of the definition of “receipt (of public benefits)” may increase disenrollment or foregone enrollment by individuals eligible to receive public benefits. This rule does not apply to U.S. citizens and aliens exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility. DHS acknowledges aliens subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility who have U.S. citizen children may decline to enroll their children in means-tested public benefit programs for which their children are eligible in order to avoid negative consequences as a result of this final rule. However, DHS declines to retain this or any other definition from the 2022 Final Rule. DHS also acknowledges the chilling effects of the 2019 Final Rule but, while closer to congressional intent behind section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA, that rule also prescribed a rigid and complex regulatory scheme that unnecessarily constrained officer discretion. DHS is publishing a clean rescission of all elements of the 2022 Final Rule other than the public charge bond provisions, which it is amending in this rule.

This rule neither alters eligibility to receive means-tested public benefits, nor states that an individual who is eligible for those benefits should not receive those benefits. If an alien has received means-tested public benefits, it is because the alien applied for and was determined eligible for those benefits by the benefit providing agency. Congress, not DHS, created a framework where certain aliens are both eligible for ( printed page 45366) means-tested public benefits and subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility.

As noted in the NPRM, in determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge, DHS will consider the statutory minimum factors and all other information relevant to assessing an applicant's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the circumstances, including any receipt of means-tested public benefits, consistent with governing precedent. 90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025). INA secs. 212(a)(4)(B) and 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B) and 1182(s).

As discussed in other comment responses, a public charge inadmissibility determination is made on an individualized, fact-specific, and case-by-case basis, focused on the alien applying for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status, not his or her family members. DHS notes that it will consider receipt of these benefits by family members, including children, to the extent there is evidence in the record that an alien's family member whom the alien is legally obligated to support applied for, was approved or certified to receive, or has received or is currently receiving means-tested public benefits due to the alien's income falling below a certain threshold.[169] In such cases, DHS would consider the alien's financial status that led to his or her family member needing to apply for or receive those benefits as part of DHS' consideration of the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances.[170]

Comment: Several commenters said SNAP disenrollment would harm immigrant children, citing research showing SNAP participation reduces food insecurity in children by one third and access to SNAP for the first 5 years of a child's life is associated with improvements in lifelong educational attainment, income, and life expectancy. Several commenters referenced studies showing immigrant children who participate in SNAP are more likely to be in good health, food secure, and reside in stable housing. Commenters expressed concern about the effects that food and nutrition benefit avoidance would have on children, including increased rates of hunger/malnutrition, harm to long-term health outcomes, increased childhood obesity, harm to long-term development, including educational attainment; and increased number of children left unattended due to parents having to take on additional work to financially compensate for the loss of food aid. Several commenters remarked that reduced childhood nutrition is associated with lower concentration, ability to retain knowledge, participation in school, while another mentioned how malnutrition affects emotional regulation. Commenters cited the effects of past policy changes, noting that following the passage of the PRWORA, more than half of U.S. citizen children in mixed-status households dropped SNAP benefits and, following the 2019 Final Rule, SNAP enrollment for U.S. citizen children living in mixed status households dropped 37 percent.

Response: This rule restores broad discretion to evaluate all facts and circumstances relevant to assessing an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge and align with long-standing policy that aliens in the United States should be self-reliant and that the availability of public benefits should not incentivize immigration. 8 U.S.C. 1601. This rule does not prevent any individual who is eligible for health or nutrition programs from applying for or receiving these benefits, but rather faithfully implements the statute regarding the inadmissibility of aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge, as Congress intended in PRWORA, as well as in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). DHS is implementing the congressional directive in PRWORA that aliens not depend on public resources to meet their needs.

Comment: Commenters expressed concern that infants in immigrant households would lose access to specialized formulas currently covered by WIC potentially causing severe malnutrition and even death, particularly for infants already facing health problems.

Several commenters expressed concerns the proposed rule would lead to decreased utilization of school meal programs, with one referencing a study from the Urban Institute wherein 13 percent of immigrant families reported avoiding free and reduced school meals programs out of fear of jeopardizing their immigration status. Commenters remarked that decreased school meal participation would compromise immigrant children's development and overall health.

Commenters expressed concerns regarding how avoidance of health care and coverage would specifically impact U.S. citizen children living in mixed-status households. A few commenters wrote that when the public charge rule was expanded in 2019, Medicaid and CHIP enrollment fell over twice as fast for children with an immigrant parent than it did for other children. Citing a KFF study,[171] a few commenters said that Medicaid and CHIP disenrollment for U.S. citizen children could be much higher than the proposed rule projects, ranging from 600,000 to 1.8 million cases of foregone enrollment.

Response: The public charge inadmissibility determination is squarely focused on aliens applying for admission or adjustment of status and the likelihood such an alien will at any time become a public charge. Therefore, DHS officers will not consider the receipt of means-tested public benefits by the alien's household members when making a public charge inadmissibility determination. However, as discussed in previous comment responses, because DHS considers the alien's assets, resources, and financial status, to the extent that there is evidence in the record that an alien's family member whom the alien is legally obligated to support applied for, was approved or certified to receive, or has received or is currently receiving means-tested public benefits due to the alien's income falling below a certain threshold, DHS will consider the alien's financial status that lead to his or her family member needing to apply for or receive those benefits as part the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances. USCIS subregulatory guidance will clarify that officers who adjudicate adjustment of status applications should only consider the receipt of means-tested public benefits by the alien as outlined above.

DHS recognizes this final rule may have indirect impacts on public health. However, the benefits of this policy outweigh the costs of this rule by ensuring that DHS faithfully applies the ( printed page 45367) public charge ground of inadmissibility in a manner that is consistent with Congress's intent that aliens are self-sufficient and are relying on their own capabilities and resources of their family, sponsor, and private organizations, rather than depending on public resources. 8 U.S.C. 1601.

Comment: Many commenters expressed concern about the impact of chilling effects on pregnant women, stating pregnant and post-partum mothers may be less likely to claim benefits under the proposed changes, leading to adverse birth outcomes. Commenters said that expanded Medicaid coverage for pregnant immigrant populations increases the use of prenatal care and, in turn, improves birth outcomes. They stated that disenrollment from public benefits programs is associated with increased prevalence of malnutrition and obesity among pregnant or breastfeeding women.

Many commenters highlighted public policy concerns and stated that the rule would result in decreased access to prenatal programs, leading to worsened infant and maternal health outcomes and higher maternal and infant mortality rates. One commenter cited reports of women returning breast pumps out of fear of jeopardizing their immigration status. Commenters said that WIC offers vital services for low-income communities, including food assistance, support with breastfeeding, and improved access to prenatal care, and that WIC participation reduces infant mortality by one third.

Commenters discussed the negative health outcomes that disenrollment from health insurance and, in turn, decreased access to prenatal care results in upticks in gestational diabetes, increased kidney infections, higher blood pressure, worsened birth outcomes, increased number of preterm births, lowered birth weights, increased instances of hypoglycemia at birth, increased rates of infant neurodevelopmental disorders, and increased cases of anemia in newborns. One commenter anticipated additional spending in State budgets to address higher rates of emergency room use, increased infectious diseases, and costly illness and injury caused by Medicaid disenrollment and decreased access to prenatal care, as well as additional spending to provide formula. Referencing multiple studies, commenters wrote that, following the initial leak of the public charge rule in 2017, Medicaid saw significant drops in prenatal Medicaid enrollment from immigrant women, resulting in drops in birth weights among newborn immigrant babies.

A few commenters expressed concern that under the proposed rule, immigrant women would avoid contraceptive services. Commenters remarked that access to contraception is critical for women's health outcomes, adding that immigrant women in the United States are already less likely to have coverage for and use sexual and reproductive health services than U.S.-born women.

Response: DHS agrees prenatal care, including through Medicaid as well as other means-tested healthcare programs, provides important benefits to expectant mothers (and gestating children) who receive it and has positive impacts on both individual and public health. However, Congress instructed DHS to minimize the incentive for aliens who attempt to immigrate or adjust status in the United States due to the availability of public benefits and promote the self-sufficiency of aliens within the United States, in accordance with PRWORA. See8 U.S.C. 1601. As discussed in other comment responses, this rule neither changes the eligibility requirements for means-tested public benefits nor precludes individuals from applying for or receiving any means-tested public benefit for which they are eligible. While DHS recognizes that this final rule may have indirect impacts on pregnant women, DHS believes that the benefits of this policy outweigh any such indirect impacts on certain populations because this rule, consistent with congressional intent, ensures that aliens applying for admission or adjustment of status who are subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility, are denied if they fail to demonstrate that they are relying on their own capabilities and resources of their family, sponsor, and private organizations, rather than depending on public resources to meet their needs. DHS does not agree receipt of means-tested public benefits by pregnant women should not be considered in a public charge determination. Similar to children, Congress did not exclude pregnant women from the public charge ground of inadmissibility and DHS must apply the ground unless the alien is seeking admission or adjustment of status in an exempt classification.

Therefore, when determining whether an alien is inadmissible, DHS will consider the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits that provide prenatal care, including through Medicaid, as well as other means-tested healthcare programs for expectant mothers and gestating children as outlined throughout this rule.[172] However, DHS will consider the fact that these benefits are related to a temporary condition—pregnancy—when considering the alien's receipt in the totality of the circumstances. DHS will also consider amount and recency of receipt of these benefits, including whether participation in the program was isolated, along with all other information relevant to the aliens' specific circumstances in the totality of the circumstances, including the statutory minimum factors.

To the extent that these commenters suggest this final rule will result in women not accessing certain benefits related to their health due to the impact on their alien family members' applications for immigration benefits, DHS notes that it will only consider receipt of these benefits by family members to the extent that there is evidence in the record that an alien's family member whom the alien is legally obligated to support applied for, was approved or certified to receive, or has received or is currently receiving means-tested public benefits due to the alien's income falling below a certain threshold. As discussed in previous comment responses, DHS will consider the alien's financial status that led to his or her family member needing to apply for or receive those benefits as part of DHS' consideration of the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances.[173]

Comment: Commenters expressed concern about the effects of the rule on caregivers of family members with a disability or chronic condition, citing the unnecessary fear the rule would create for immigrants applying for disability benefits for family members, even when those family members are U.S. citizens. One commenter pointed out that parents of children with disabilities, even those with medical insurance who earn middle class incomes, may rely on public benefits for medical, educational, and therapeutic supports for health and wellbeing for children with a disability due to the high cost of services such as In-Home ( printed page 45368) Supportive Services and Independent Living Services. Others said some caregivers must leave the workforce to care for their family member and that these families should not have to also decline necessary disability services. Commenters raised possible caregiver burnout due to the additional stresses resulting from the rule. One of these commenters said that when disabled family members lose access to services they need, or withdraw from programs out of fear, the burden shifts to unpaid caregivers who are often parents, spouses, or extended family members. The commenter emphasized the impact on specific communities, adding caregivers are disproportionately women of color and would be most affected.

One commenter identified the lack of clarity in the rule or exceptions for benefits received by individuals with a disability or chronic condition would force families to choose between staying together and accessing vital services due to immigration consequences. Another said the rule would result in reduced access to personal care and home and community-based services, which is essential for individuals with a disability and the well-being of entire family systems.

Response: This rule returns DHS to faithfully applying the statute and intent of Congress regarding public charge inadmissibility determinations and does not prevent individuals from applying for or obtaining benefits for which they are eligible. DHS disagrees this rule prevents U.S. citizens from obtaining benefits for which they are eligible. As discussed in other comment responses, DHS acknowledges aliens subject to this rule may decline to enroll their children in, or may choose to disenroll their children from, means-tested public benefits for which their children are eligible under PRWORA, in order to avoid negative consequences as a result of this final rule. DHS will only take into consideration the receipt of means-tested public benefits by U.S. citizens who are part of the alien's household to the extent that there is evidence in the record that an alien's family member whom the alien is legally obligated to support applied for, was approved or certified to receive, or has received or is currently receiving means-tested public benefits due to the alien's income falling below a certain threshold. In such cases, DHS would consider the alien's financial status that led to his or her family member needing to apply for or receive those benefits as part of DHS' consideration of the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances.[174]

DHS believes it would be unwarranted for U.S. citizens and aliens exempt from public charge inadmissibility to disenroll from a public benefit program or forgo enrollment in response to this rule when such individuals are not subject to this rule. DHS is responsible for faithfully applying the and the public charge ground of inadmissibility in a manner consistent with Congress's intent that aliens are self-sufficient and rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations. 8 U.S.C. 1601(2)(A). DHS is prohibited under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act from discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability solely on the basis of that disability under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any federally conducted program or activity. As noted in the NPRM, in the context of any disability, officers will comply with existing law and consider whether or to what extent an alien's disability is likely to impact his or her ability to be self-sufficient, ensuring that disability is not used as the sole determinant of an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. See90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS appreciates the commenters' concern about access to home and community-based services. DHS notes that in considering an alien's application for, approval or certification for receipt, or current and/or past receipt of any means-tested public benefits, DHS considers the nature of the benefit along with the surrounding circumstances for receipt, such as the recency, duration, amount of receipt, reason for receipt, and whether the reason has likelihood to persist. When considering the receipt of home and community-based services intended to meet the needs of beneficiaries at a fraction of the cost of long-term institutional care,[175] DHS also considers the fact that such services are less costly in the totality of the circumstances.

DHS reiterates, however, that this rule is intended to follow PRWORA's directive that aliens should be self-sufficient and not be dependent on public resources and therefore, DHS declines to limit the effect of the rulemaking to avoid the possibility that individuals subject to this rule may disenroll or choose not to enroll in means-tested public benefits. DHS will make public charge inadmissibility determinations on an individualized basis and cannot ensure an alien will not be found inadmissible under the public charge ground if he or she applied for, has been approved or certified to receive, or has received or is currently receiving any means-tested public benefits.

DHS also appreciates the potential effects of confusion regarding the rule's scope and effect. While DHS cannot completely eliminate the possibility that public charge inadmissibility determinations under this final rule will, in practice, negatively impact some groups more than others, USCIS will provide training to officers and issue guidance on all aspects of public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule, to support accuracy, consistency, and reliability in individual determinations. As to the comment regarding racial and gender disparities, DHS addresses concerns about bias and discrimination more fully elsewhere in this rule.

Comment: Many commenters were concerned about the effects of the rule on children with disabilities who rely on medical, education, and therapeutic supports for their health and well-being and that parents are already declining these supports for fear of immigration consequences. Commenters stated children will miss early identification and intervention windows for autism and developmental delays. One commenter pointed out that special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act are available to any child with a disability who qualifies, regardless of income.

Response: DHS believes it must minimize the incentive for aliens to seek to immigrate to, or adjust status in, the United States due to the availability of public benefits and promote the self-sufficiency of aliens within the United States, in accordance with PRWORA. See8 U.S.C. 1601. DHS acknowledges that aliens subject to this rule may decline to enroll in, or may choose to ( printed page 45369) disenroll from, public benefits for which they may be eligible under PRWORA, in order to avoid negative consequences as a result of this final rule. However, DHS has authority to consider applications for, approval or certification for receipt, and current and/or past receipt of means-tested public benefits when assessing an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, even where such actions may ultimately result in discouraging aliens from receiving means-tested public benefits for which they are eligible, and DHS believes the benefits of doing so, as described throughout this rule, outweigh any negative indirect effects to children if parents choose to decline available supports. Although individuals may reconsider their receipt of means-tested public benefits in light of future immigration consequences, this rule does not prohibit an alien from obtaining any means-tested public benefit for which he or she is eligible.

To address the concerns about receipt of public benefits whose eligibility is not based on an alien's income or assets and instead are available to every individual regardless of their income, as stated elsewhere in this final rule, those benefits would not be considered because they are not means-tested.

Comment: One commenter stated that the exclusion of people with disabilities from non-cash assistance programs such as Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program would directly target people who require electricity to support medical equipment, such as ventilators and power wheelchairs, pointing out that many such households include members with serious medical conditions.

Response: DHS disagrees the rule directly targets individuals who receive non-cash benefits related to their health or medical conditions. DHS determined considering applications for, approval or certification for receipt, or any current or past receipt of means-tested public benefits is consistent with Congress's intent that aliens inside the United States are self-sufficient and rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, sponsors, and private organizations. See8 U.S.C. 1601. As discussed previously, when considering an alien's applications for, approval or certification for receipt, or any current or past receipt of means-tested public benefits, DHS will consider the nature of the benefit as well as the circumstances surrounding receipt, such as the recency, duration, amount of receipt, reason for receipt, and whether the reason has likelihood to persist. However, nothing in this rule directs aliens to disenroll from any means-tested public benefit.

Comment: One organization commented that institutionalization should not be considered as a potential negative factor given longstanding institutional bias and expressed concern that the rule would increase the risk of hospitalization or institutional placement for individuals with a disability or chronic condition.

This organization added that Medicaid and disability service systems have historically made institutional care easier to access and more consistently funded than home- and community-based services, so placement in institutions is often driven by system constraints rather than individual choice or need. Fear of immigration consequences may result in individuals avoiding community-based services and increases in the likelihood that preventable health supports or gaps escalate into crises that result in institutional placement, and undermines autonomy, safety, and quality of life. They pointed out that institutionalization would result in higher costs for States if individuals avoid or are not able to take advantage of community-based supports due to fear.

Response: DHS acknowledges that when patients lose medical coverage, overall costs to State or local governments may increase, and there may be long-term consequences for patients and their families and communities. However, DHS has determined that, like other means-tested public benefits, long-term institutionalization at government expense is indicative of an alien's lack of self-sufficiency and dependence on the government to meet his or her needs. DHS does not have data to assess how many aliens are both subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility and are institutionalized on a long-term basis at government expense, including when such services are covered by Medicaid, and as a result, is unable to quantify the impact of retaining this long-standing policy in the final rule. However, DHS believes the impact is small. DHS notes that in considering an alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, DHS considers the nature of the benefit along with the circumstances surrounding the alien's receipt, such as the recency, duration, amount of receipt, reason for receipt, and whether the reason has likelihood to persist.

As to the comments about home and community-based services, DHS acknowledges that these services meet the needs of beneficiaries at a fraction of the cost of long-term institutional care.[176] When considering the receipt of home and community-based services, DHS considers the purpose of these benefits as well as the fact that these benefits are less costly than long-term institutionalization. However, DHS reiterates that Congress's intent has consistently been that aliens are self-sufficient, and DHS declines to make changes to the rule based on this comment in order to faithfully apply the law.

Comment: Commenters stated the rule would risk the safety and stability of survivors of violence, causing survivors to withdraw from shelters and crisis programs or seek other help due to fear of immigration consequences and increasing the risk of survivors of violence returning to their abusers for financial security. One commenter emphasized even U.S. citizen survivors may be afraid of seeking assistance if they have a family member who may seek admission or another immigration benefit in the future.

Several commenters stated the rule reinforces structural conditions abusers use to isolate and control survivors of violence, and empowers those abusers while trapping survivors in dangerous situations, putting their lives at risk, and deterring them from reporting crimes or seeking help. Two commenters provided the example that the rule would permit DHS to deny LPR status to a survivor of domestic violence because she reported her abuser to the police and received victim services through the local police department to ensure her safety and that of her children.

Response: DHS strongly disagrees that the rule risks safety and stability of survivors of violence, reinforces structural conditions that benefit abusers, or empowers abusers. As mandated by Congress under section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), any alien applying for admission to the United States is inadmissible if he or she is likely at any time to become a public charge. Survivors of domestic violence adjusting status as self- ( printed page 45370) petitioners under VAWA [177] are exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility. Therefore, any receipt of means-tested public benefits or other victim services will not be considered when adjudicating their application for adjustment of status. Survivors of domestic violence adjusting status under a category that is subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility are not prevented from receiving means-tested public benefits or other services under this rule. But, DHS will consider receipt of any means-tested public benefits, as well as any evidence in the record that the alien applied for or has been approved or certified to receive any means-tested public benefits, in the totality of alien's circumstances, including the nature of the benefit, the recency, duration, and amount of receipt, the reason for the receipt, and whether the reason has or is likely to persist. 90 FR 52168, 52188 (Nov. 19, 2025).

Comment: A commenter said the rule deters survivors seeking U and T nonimmigrant visas from seeking help and undermines the purpose of the statutes, risks being declared unlawful under the APA and established principles of statutory interpretation, and urged DHS to preserve protections for survivors of violence and trafficking. Another commenter requested DHS withdraw the rule for similar reasons.

Response: DHS strongly disagrees that the Final Rule deters survivors of crime or trafficking from seeking help or undermines the statute. Aliens seeking T and U nonimmigrant status are exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility. Similarly, aliens with prima facie applications for T or U nonimmigrant status, or who were granted T or U nonimmigrant status who are applying to adjust status under sections 245(a), (l), or (m) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), (l), or (m), are exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility.[178] Finally, certain battered aliens who are “qualified aliens” under PRWORA are similarly exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility.[179] Because these aliens are not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility, their receipt of means-tested public benefits will not be considered when adjudicating their applications for adjustment.

Comment: Commenters voiced concern about the proposed rule's potential impact on child care workers. Given 22 percent of child care workers are immigrants, one commenter suggested that ambiguity in the proposed rule would discourage early education immigrant workers, some of whom rely on public benefits due to low wages, from utilizing public benefits, exacerbating staffing shortages, noting in part due to recent U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests, since January 2025, there are 39,000 fewer immigrant women in the child care workforce and 77,000 fewer American mothers of preschool-age children in the workforce.

Response: DHS disagrees the final rule is ambiguous or that the removal of the 2022 Final Rule will cause child care workers to drop out of the workforce. As noted in other comment responses, DHS was clear in the NPRM and is clear in this final rule, after rescission of the 2022 Final Rule officers will be able to consider the receipt of all means-tested public benefits received by aliens subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility. DHS is clarifying that previously excluded means-tested public benefits will not be considered if received before the effective date of this final rule and that means-tested public benefits received by the alien's family members are only considered in certain circumstances related to the alien's assets, resources, and financial status. Finally, the receipt of means-tested public benefits by child care workers is one consideration in the totality of the circumstances and officers have full discretion to consider all other information and evidence relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations. DHS neither disputes the argument that low wage child care workers receive means-tested public benefits, nor that child care workers serve an important role in the labor force. However, while this rule may cause certain aliens to forgo receiving means-tested public benefits, DHS disagrees that this rule will cause alien child care workers to drop out of the workforce; if these aliens remain in the United States, they will need to continue working in order to support themselves and their families. In addition, rather than relying on government programs to meet their needs, these aliens should rely on their own resources as well as those of their relatives, friends, or private organizations to help supplement their income. See 8 U.S.C. 1601(2)(A). Finally, DHS notes that the studies cited by the commenter concerning the child care workforce, while suggestive, do not directly support the claims made by the commenter. Specifically, the study on the percentage of immigrants in the early care and education workforce, based on American Community Survey (ACS) data, cannot distinguish between aliens who are LPRs (and therefore not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility) and aliens who are not LPRs and may in the future seek to adjust status or be admitted to the United States (who are affected by this rule).[180] The study cited by the commenter for the claim that “43 percent of child care workers used public assistance” included assistance received by family or household members (“public safety net household participation”), not just the child care workers themselves, and did not distinguish between U.S. citizens and aliens in the workforce.[181] Since aliens who are not LPRs are generally ineligible for the means-tested public benefit programs included in the survey, it is reasonable to assume that even if the child care workers responding to the survey received those benefits themselves, they were either U.S. citizens or, less likely, LPRs. The studies show that there are many aliens in the child care workforce and that many households containing child care workers receive at least one means-tested public benefit. The studies do not show that alien child care workers subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility receive those benefits and would choose to disenroll or forego enrollment. Regarding ICE arrests of unauthorized aliens, this is outside the scope of this rulemaking.

Comment: A commenter asked whether any interim standard would govern decisions made by DHS between ( printed page 45371) rescission of the 2022 Final Rule and implementation of any new policy.

Response: No, DHS is not implementing an interim standard. The statute requires DHS to consider an applicant's age, health, family status, assets, resources and financial status, and education and skills. DHS also believes Congress intended officers to consider any receipt of means-tested public benefits by the alien applying for admission or adjustment of status. Precedent decisions that have guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades and remain good law today dictate that DHS officers consider as well as any other factors and information they find relevant to determining whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge in the totality of the circumstances, as Congress intended.[182] Therefore, aliens seeking admission as immigrants and nonimmigrants and aliens applying for adjustment of status should expect any fact or circumstance present in their case that is relevant to their likelihood of becoming a public charge will be considered by DHS.

Comment: One commenter recommended DHS provide more details on characteristics that would lead one to be considered “likely at any time to become a public charge,” and outline those treated as weaker or contextual factors.

Response: DHS declines to attach specific weight to any particular factor because the public charge inadmissibility determination is a subjective, discretionary, and case-specific determination. In every case, DHS will make a determination based on assessing the alien's age, health, family status, assets, resources, and financial status, and education and skills, the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits, and any other factors the DHS officer determines are relevant to assessing that individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. DHS believes it would be inconsistent with precedent decisions to provide a narrow outline detailing what makes an alien likely at any time to become a public charge given it varies depending on the facts of an individual alien's case.[183] DHS declines to prescribe value or attribute weight to any factors or circumstances relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations given DHS's interest in preserving officer discretion and the highly fact-specific nature of such determinations.

If the commenter's concern is about an alien's ability to provide the information needed for adjudication, DHS notes that aliens may provide any information they believe relevant in demonstrating they are not likely at any time to become a public charge. Furthermore, officers may issue an RFE or NOID when appropriate.

Comment: Commenters stated DHS is replacing transparent regulations with vague language and standards, with one suggesting DHS expand the factors officers can consider under 8 CFR 212.22(a) to address the concerns identified in the NPRM, rather than leaving the application of the statute vague and undefined for officers while others stated there would be a lack of clear definitions and standards.

Response: DHS is not replacing the 2022 Final Rule. Rather, DHS rescinded and removed the problematic 2022 Final Rule, which ensures DHS officers make public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(4), PRWORA, and past precedent decisions that have guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades. 90 FR 52168, 52184 (Nov. 19, 2025). Removing regulations enables DHS officers to make accurate and precise public charge inadmissibility determinations, consistent with congressional intent. 90 FR 52168, 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). Under this rule, DHS officers will be empowered to consider not only mandatory statutory factors, receipt of means-tested public benefits, and any evidence in the record the alien applied for or has been approved or certified to receive any means-tested public benefits, but also any other case-specific evidence that the officer determines is relevant to assessing an individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. This restores a public charge inadmissibility determination that trusts in and relies on DHS officers' sound judgment and discretion, as envisioned by Congress when it enacted section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).

DHS notes aliens applying for adjustment of status may submit any evidence they feel is relevant to assessing their self-sufficiency and likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. As such, aliens will have ample opportunity to provide USCIS with the full context surrounding their likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge.

DHS does not believe that following congressional intent, as set forth in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA, leads to a vague public charge inadmissibility policy because the statute and decades of precedent are clear that officers must apply the totality of the circumstances approach. To the extent that the statute includes a requirement to consider a non-exhaustive list of factors in public charge inadmissibility determinations, DHS believes that this is evidence that Congress intended to leave room for officer discretion in each individual determination. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B).